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Airline Pilot Technical Theory, Aircraft Accidents Adam Howey Airline Pilot Technical Theory, Aircraft Accidents Adam Howey

Manuals

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00:00

Verbal Reasoning

Adam Sam. Manuals. Yeah, when did you last have a reading lesson? I was going to ask you. Whether you remember doing those verbal reasoning exercises, Obviously, and selection for airline, I don't know about you. But I kind of always wondered like what are these for it because And now you need maths to be a pilot and maybe, need physics and a bit of science.

00:22

But Why you need to be able to read a passage, that's really confusing and say if statements are true or false or cannot say and I never really understood it Until I, Start flying and reading manuals. It's this passage is this statement. Patently true. Yeah. Patiently untrue or cannot say yeah.

00:41

Well everybody knows because I'm a pilot that I'm really good at maths. why you laughing. Yeah. Okay. Yeah, I'm not so good at maths or physics. Really? No But I'm any good at verbal comprehension. I feel that That you would definitely better at verbal comprehension and I was used to carry me through verbal comprehension sort of practise.

01:04

That was selection test. Yeah. When we were prepping for selection, might my, my verbal reasoning was my weakest and it was the same through school at English language was was one of my weakest. Subjects, I struggled with it. And yeah, I couldn't really understand why it formed part of selection, but now I do, Well as I've got old, I think I've become more and more interested in other careers.

01:26

And and what they really mean when you're Like 16 or earlier. And yeah you think to be a pilot they must be really good at maths and physics. And you're understanding of what is involved in a career is made up of laser cliches. I don't think the career services that was available to me at the time.

01:44

Really helped me understand what a job really involved. For example. My understanding of a solicitor or a lawyer. Is that the main skill is the The use the ability to wield the English language. Yeah, they're advantage. Definitely. And that's kind of playing into what What we're going to talk about here, I think Yeah I think a lot of like law is is yeah, it's essentially just you're interpretation of The law and that's what solicitors and lawyers.

02:16

Argue over is what the meaning of that law is like, how that's written? How can that be interpreted? Is basically law, isn't it? But to how's that relevant to our topic. So it's relevant to our topic because these aircraft manuals, which will maybe go on to details and there is a lot of interpretation required and Will probably use this phrase a few times, but there's black and this white and there's grey.

02:40

Okay, so the manuals are written black and white. And something's a really clear in the manuals. You must not and it is forbidden or it's not authorised. Really clear but some stuff Can be a bit more grey, a bit more ambiguous and open to interpretation. You can use that to your advantage.

02:58

I'm or you can you can use that to help you. But, the important thing is is aircraft manuals are Big long. Lots of words and open to interpretation. So, I now understand why the verbal reasoning exercises were. Were part of selection. I, Don't have any physical aircraft manuals. No, when we started flying.

03:27

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Paper and Digital Manuals

Yeah, we were issued with Paper manuals. Yeah. So i remember like going to get mine in my first airline, it was like a whole day to go and collect your manuals drive, to the airport, and only had a small car at the time, but it was a good job.

03:41

I didn't have any passengers with me because it pretty much filled the whole back seats. It was a really effective, but up and down twice, I think it's like two boxes, massive boxes, full of. So, if that manuals issue to a pilot stacked on the floor, how high reckon Us like probably, like up to your waist at least.

03:59

Yeah, maybe more makes. You look really clever when they yeah, sat in your bedroom. Yeah. Of these with all these massive flight manuals. I used to get the updates, send in the post to meet you. So each little page is whole punched, and yeah, there's, I don't know what there, be like, 10 ring, binders, or yeah, yeah.

04:20

Provides to 10, ring binders. And then maybe more than five And then you were supposed to take each page that had any revision on. It could just be Could even just be like a ref like a, like a very small or something. Yeah. Yeah, the find that page. Rip it out.

04:37

Rip out the whole one. Put the new on him. Yeah. Which gave you? A. I have like flawless understanding almost of what had changed. Yeah. Because he had to physically . You had to physically insert it and the changes. Yeah, I agree. So if you got any manuals anymore, so no, it's all done on on.

04:55

Well, ipad or Android or you know whatever kind of tablet on a tablet basically. And yes, i don't have any manuals and you're absolutely right. It's hard to keep track of updates because you just tap a button now. And within 30 seconds or you manuals are updated and although it tells you, what the changes are you have to actually Actively interrogate.

05:17

You know, to make sure you understand the changes. So it's definitely harder, Perhaps, where we are now is like, It caught between. The the past where we had paper manuals and some point in the future, I can imagine Where, The information. Produce for pilots. Is. Is in its most usable dynamic.

05:43

Possible. And form. And why somewhere in the middle where we've got like digital versions of paper manuals. But they started to introduce like you've got your search functions you can annotate. You can Organise them as you like you can have multiple tabs open. Yeah. But In a sense that well, they are still digital versions of paper documents.

06:06

Yeah. Yeah. But a time may come, where the information that a pilot needs available to them, which is the manuals we're talking about, It might be organised completely differently. Yeah. Because it's Because, And the The options available digitally. Are like vast. Yeah, but having them organised in like, a sort of pseudo paper.

06:30

Like a fake paper document. Yeah or digital paper document doesn't necessarily suit the information. No yeah yeah. So I feel like we're sort of in the middle of Of that process. Obviously, the aircraft. We fly. You and I sorry and and say probably fifth more than 50% of the world's fleet was it.

06:50

They were all designed and built before. Anybody really foresaw. Tablets. Or Airbus have been committed to less paper cockpit since the 1990s. Yeah. So now we've kind of retro fitted tablets to most aircraft or airlines of retrofitted. EFB electronic flight bags by sticking. Laptops or iPads. Yeah literally like a sticking a game boy to the side of the flight there.

07:16

Yeah. To kind of try and integrate. And I'd actually like to talk about. The mix of this unregulated to to degree less regulated device. Yeah. It's stuck in such a regulated environment where all the other software we use and all the other buttons we press in the flight deck are so prescribed and well thought out and slow to iterate in.

07:40

Yet, you're sticking your iPad in which 10 minutes ago, you might have been Watching. Hey Duggeeon with your kids at breakfast then you open it up in the flight deck and it's still there. Yeah, it's like a it's like It's a crash in of like the future. Yeah and the wild west of technology right into the flight deck which should be the most stale sterile like objective focused environment like we used to bring a newspaper into the flight deck and that was the most foreign object in there.

08:08

Yeah. And now you potentially have Singing and dancing internet with Netflix. Yeah, right, right beside the side stick. Yeah, So that's something that's interesting to me. I'm on that topic. Why? One of the I always, you know, when we've issued with our tablets, I always thought like that'sn't you know, surely like it's just cheaper to keep paper manuals like like issue.

08:33

However, many hundreds or thousands, depends on the size of your airline that many iPads or tablets that must That must be a huge cost but then I because I like maths, I worked out Say I figured it out that based on about 20 kilogrammes of manuals. On an aeroplane, it would cost 800 grams of fuel per hour to carry those manuals.

08:54

So what account?. Yes, it basically, I went out that and an aircraft would have to fly for 200 days. To pay without manuals to pay for two iPads. For like the Captain And so basically. So it doesn't take long basically to cover the cost That's just the way of them.

09:11

That's just again, the processing and you had your, do you got their cost of print in the manuals in and keeping them updated at home? But the manuals has to be a copy of those manuals on board, the aircraft. Yeah. And When you park the aircraft up at night, if you're on the late flight.

09:27

Yeah. It's usually a guy with a van, you pulls up, and he used to be a guy, the van, he still comes up. Maybe with. We have a couple of manual sets still paper on the flight date but you used to come up and his job was to refill all the manual do that.

09:42

Same job that you do at home with the updates. Yeah and they're like a third party service usually. And now that third party service is some geek who who controls their dissemination of all these updates and stuff just via push of a button. Yeah. So it's obviously I mean it's yeah massive saving although Hard to like justify like buying hundreds of iPads, but easy cell to the pilot, so, isn't it?

10:04

Yeah, yeah. Here's an iPad versus like here's something you don't want to carry around in your bag like, yeah, definitely. Everybody's like, yeah, sure. Give it me. Yeah. Say. Do you want to talk about manual structure or more? Just I think. Very brief. Well, in your stride lighter talked to you as a trainer right now and ask you How much training of a new pilot.

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How to Use

10:31

And is geared towards the The use of the manual, the way to read it, the understanding of how it's organised. Um, very little really i suppose, I mean, certainly not very much when actively Training like a type rating but I imagine in ground school is obviously going to be one of the topics covered in ground school.

10:51

But during your conversion course, or your training, I guess reference might be made to FCOMs. Pilot operating handbooks training, manuals, that sort of thing point people in the direction of what about best practise. In what sense? Well, If you look at from a CRM point of view, Yeah, and the SHEL model which is taught to understand the environment you're in, you've got your software hardware environment, liveware, And software actually is the manuals and the procedures.

11:26

And Not necessarily the physical manuals. But, any written documentation that you might interact with The hardware would be the Include the software in the FMS. When we talk about software in the SHELL model, that's a whole part of that model because the the manuals, the operating procedures, makeup such a big influence.

11:47

However, If they're a system in their own right? Yeah. How much training do we have on? Oh yeah. I use of them. Yeah. And how they're designed and their flaws and their good things that are very little really like very little in my opinion it's more you might Come up with a situation in training where you need to refer to?

12:08

Yeah, a manual. But so just you know by default you end up talking about manuals but I think there's no. I wonder how often a pilot is interrogated like in the in-training or examination as to how they actually understand the information that they're using and and where they got it from, yeah, often now.

12:26

A pilot will Google inverted commas. Use the search function in the digital manuals to find the keywords and find information. Yeah. Some maybe like quite rigorous about the hierarchy of that information. Like where it which manual it sits in? Yeah. In what context? Others might just read the sentence.

12:46

Yeah. And then go I can use that sentence to prove or disprove what the information I need. Yeah that's it's just interesting to me if If we do need or don't need training on the use of the manual. So your question was, do we talk about how they're organised in my opinion?

13:05

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What is Included

The organisation of the manuals is really important to understand. So we've been using the word manuals but you just said FCOM flight crew operating manual. Yeah some places in the world might refer to is the flight manual or the aircraft flight manual or just a pilots manual. Yeah. But we're talking about information.

13:25

That is specifically given to the pilots. Yes, in manual. Format. Yep. And these manuals have to serve you. When you're training. From being a new pilot when you're doing a type conversion, when you're on the line, they have to serve training captains. You know examination, pilots everybody uses the same document So that document Has to be written with the with the user in mind and the use cases in mind.

13:52

Yes. So it's really interesting to me how it's written what information is included to the pilot and what isn't because if you're in a learning, Process. So you'll learn to be a pilot that is somewhat of a linear process like as you learn bit by bit, but we use these manuals.

14:10

It in addition to like, when we're learning to fly the aircraft, we use them right in the middle of the line operation. Yep. So it might be that I need to look up how to fly a non-precision approach. So the way that it's written and the system of information that's presented to me there, It's like being carefully thought out.

14:26

It's like what does this pilot need to know right now. Yes and what don't they need to know and how do they need to know it? And and then you go through your whole career. So sort of Understanding the aircraft and the procedures that you fly through the lens of.

14:43

Somebody who's decided what what you need to know and what you don't need to know. That's very true. I mean, On a normal flight. I mean, how many times would you look at your manuals? Probably At least. 10. 20, maybe. Yeah. We use them all the time. Basically. Yeah, we do.

15:03

I mean, you've got pilots who He won to know, want you to know. That they know more than you about something and they'll have information. That's not in any of their manuals. Yeah, you might even have trainers who Make a point. I mean, when I was a technical instructor, The line you are treading was if you had the luxury of a day to train a pilot about the fuel system.

15:27

They they would they would a lot of them would really enjoy. Find out things that they hadn't known for 10 years or something about the fuel system, but how relevant Or dangerous. Is it for them to understand that piece of information? Yeah. And what purpose are we serving? You know, by Of having people or documents that like, give you that extra information.

15:49

Yeah. Part of the digital manual. Now is that you've got your level one two and three I don't know if how common that is with. Digital documentation. In other airlines. But the service that we're familiar with you've got like level 1 which is like need to know. Yeah, you can press a button and then Instantly are underneath the information.

16:08

If there is any level two information it will appear. Yeah when it wasn't there before and that's like a nice to know. Yeah. And then you've even got level three. Yeah which is like training. Captain Trivia. Yeah. Well yeah we theorists like yeah. Help understand. Yeah. Yeah. Agree. Talking about manuals just to get to the core of it.

16:29

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Why have a Manual

It's important. It sounds boring. But in your career, this is like the main way that I mean, what is an airline, you know, when you take away all the pilots and the CEOs, what would be left? It would be the manuals. Like, what is different about one from one.

16:44

Airline to the other, that's actually tangible. Which it should be written in the manuals. Yeah. And the aircraft manufacturer, they write all the manuals that you need. Yeah. And then an airline comes along, guys. Well, we know better. So we're gonna rewrite the the SOPs, which much frustrate the manufacturers.

17:01

Yeah. And they have to, I think sort of approve the variations of the way you operate the aircraft and as the world's become a bit more litigious. The airlines have realised, they need to go back to and sticking more closely to the way the manufacturer say you fly the aircraft.

17:17

Yes, there's a crash. Yeah, the court say, hold on the people that design, the aircraft said, flight like this and you've come along said flight totally differently. Yeah. Yeah, it's interesting, isn't it because obviously, The airlines have to adapt it slightly to their own operations. Every airlines operation is different and But you could argue but why I mean yeah, craft can operate I guess any other way as well?

17:38

That Changes are made is due to experience. I think that happens possibly, you know, incidents accidents. If there's been something happened within an airline or they've noticed a trend that we're getting into other things now, like, like monitoring of flight data and stuff, but if they notice any trends or things that happening then they might need to change the SOP.

17:58

Yeah, well, safety reasons, this comes down to what I'm saying, is what we actually talking about here. We talking about boring manuals, or we talk about, why they exist in the first place. Because I wondered, I wonder when the first aircraft manual ever came about. And I thought, well, in like World War II.

18:12

Yeah, they might not really have had much time to like, write a manual that and They might have decided, well, we are trained in a lot of pilots because we're losing a lot. So, We need to write something down because all the experiences being shot out of the sky and killed.

18:26

Yeah, it's like tangent. Yeah, I remember reading a book by Jeffrey Wellam who was Spitfire pilot and yeah I was like fascinated by the fact that he got pulled out of like he's equivalent of flight training early and after like a few hours of training in another aircraft just got thrown into Spitfire There.

18:45

Wasn't that there was no two seater is spitfire, there's no manual just like off. You gauge just getting figure out. Basically, there was no yeah, there was no manual, Ernest K Gann said the rulebooks are paper and they will not cushion a certain meeting of stone and metal. Yeah, but there's another clever phrase which is SOPs are written in blood.

19:07

So why have a manual at all? Well, every pilot that's gone before you who's made a mistake or nearly made a mistake as essentially written down or don't do this or do it like this. Yeah, and over years of aviation and what some people would even call Airmanship, on top of the manufacturers, understanding of what they've built.

19:28

You get these. Manuals, and at the core you get there standard operating procedures and you go outside them or you disregard them. At your peril. Yep. There's plenty of times. Where Ernest K Gann says the end of the day. The rule books not going to save is not going to be the last line of defence.

19:46

Yeah, that's the pilot's job. And the cabin crew are the goalkeepers, of the whole industry. Yeah. If anybody else can make a mistake, the manufacturer traffic control, the engineer in the morning, including the people that have written. The manuals can make a mistake. Yep. But if you stay with inside your standard operating procedures, Which are communicated on paper in manuals, then you're within a really well.

20:10

A risk assessed framework safety bubble? Yeah, of hundred years of aviation. Yeah. And however, many hundreds of that, millions of hours on their type that you're on. Yeah, So the SOPs and the manuals are updated to take account of current accidents best practises and Stuff reflecting in the whole industry.

20:32

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MEL

And a lot of that stuff. And, A big chunk of that operational stuff is in OMB. In the operational part. What's your favourite manual? I do like the FCTM Flight crew, the training manual. But that's because I've become, you know, I've used it a lot. I like the MEL MInimum Equipment List , what’s the MEL

20:55

The minimum equipment list? Yeah. MEL is basically so it forms part of OMB. And it's basically aircraft got like hundreds of thousands of parts moving parts. So this there's the minimum equipment list and the CDL, the configuration deviation list and I'll talk about briefly the differences. But yeah. So essentially The MEL out.

21:14

Tells you what bits of the aircraft can be missing, and it still be legal to go. And fly that aeroplane? So, How often would we open that book then probably figuratively, Probably. Like, Every other flight. I imagine so some flights you'll arrive for work and they'll be an MEL item.

21:37

So something, missing or broken or needs replacing And it'll give you a reference to the MEL. So you're going to look at up and make sure it's okay, it's in compliance. Or occasionally you might have a fully serviceable aircraft. But at some point during your day, Something goes wrong, or there's a failure of some sort of equipment, and you might refer the MEL To think about future implications.

21:59

Like if we go if we continue to destination, are we going to be able to depart back without this piece of? So we don't actually fly along with the manual on our lap. Like what do we do next? What do you? Yeah. And if something goes wrong. It's something breaks.

22:14

We deal with it in real time. Yeah. A modern aircraft using an electronic systems. It's a Push this button, turn it off. Turn this other system on And what you're saying is that A the consultation of some manuals like the MEL is basically done on the ground so we carry them with us and then we think a for the next sector And watch the implication.

22:36

You know, something going wrong. Can we plan a fly with something? This, there's not working. So an example might be something as serious as you might have two systems on an aircraft that pressurise, the aircraft and one of them might not be working, but we can still go fly in but it might say well the speed breaks have to be operative.

22:57

Because if the pressurization system fails, you would need to descend a certain rate to ensure the cabin attitude stayed breathable, and you need the speed breaks to do that. So if the speed breaks happened, not to be working as well. Yeah. Just by coincidence. Then you can't carry this defect But then we started off by talking about verbal comprehension.

23:19

Yeah. So, You might be opening this manual. You've not got long before you supposed to depart. You have to read this text declare that people say about the Airbus. For example, it was written by Manufactured by the French written by a German translated into another language and then into English or something.

23:37

Yeah, yeah. So you've got a read this manual. Got to comprehend what it's saying. Yes. And sometimes you want the manual to say something, then. And you're able to interpret it in a certain way. Certain way. Yeah. But if there's any doubt there is no doubt, no, you can kind of bend the manual.

23:54

In certain directions and navigate the grey which is what you're saying earlier. Definitely. Yeah. You don't have to be. Yeah. Because the manual isn't the last line of fence. The pilot is yes to your interpretation of that manual. Can come in useful. It can mean it can. Well, In OMA is probably a line that says of, Captain's not happy then we're not going flying.

24:15

Yeah, yeah, yeah. Says, well, the MEL is a good example. Yeah, it will say the interoperability of defective systems is not taking account. So if the captain thinks well, the air leads US. Yeah, the APUs US. Yeah, and I'm doing a flight with the gear down and something the MEL hasn't taken account of all four of those to.

24:37

Yeah and he's just not a good day. Yeah, I don't know. Anyone explain it anymore, I'm not getting flying. Yeah, the MEL says exactly that, you know, in in isolation each of those, each of those items is means. You could go flying but all four together. Could put it into the unsafe or unacceptable, yes.

24:54

So yeah. Interpretation and sort is required The wording as well. you touched on the language? But yeah. The the amount of times you read in a manual, the difference between should and must It should is not recommended. It's required. It's Recommend it all this different. I think a good 15 years ago, the CAA went through all the And what was called, jar Ops, manuals and deleted “should”, and “could” which it was riddled with, yeah, because What does should mean?

25:30

Yeah, What does could mean? And I use that in my day-to-day life all the time after I'd learnt that Now, I don't think you should operate with. I feel that some people operate all the time in the back of their mind thinking that they're going to be stood in a courtroom, which It's never really occurred to me.

25:47

I don't know where some pilots. Where? I don't know where that, as strong feeling is that is, as come from, I don't. Fear the litigation. It doesn't hang in my head. I'm all the time. But I feel like some pilots do fly like they're gonna get in trouble all the time.

26:04

Yeah. And so should incurred. A meaningless. Yeah. So there are there are things that are Shouldn't could nest on necessarily meaningless no but then not very useful to a pilot but I'm trying to think of stuff. My yeah, yeah there's a lot of phrases in the manuals which are open to interpretation that are a bit useless.

26:26

So I one one, I read the day. Every attempt should be made too. But does that mean? I mean like, let me guess that's not in OMB. I can't remember where it was being like OMA. Yeah. Every attempt should be made too. So that's like well. This should be done, but if you've tried and you how many attempts then, how many?

26:47

Yeah, then maybe you don't have to do it, you know, it's like, and that's goes all the way back to this verbal reasoning. Kind of like, your interpretation of, yeah, those verbal reasons are made more sense. If they gave you an actual passage, From OMB that said, yeah, if no ILS is available then.

27:05

He should seek the approach with the lowest minimal or, you know, I give you no example in the performance manual, when it talks about runway, surface condition, for takeoff and icing conditions. There's a where it is really bad. It says do not take off. Yeah, but if it's quite bad, it says take off is not recommended.

27:23

Yeah. Okay. I probably wouldn't. But I could, you know, because it's not telling me a kind, it's just telling me it's not recommended. Well, Hi. You know, I might recommend that it is, you know, I mean, yes, that there is, yeah, I think that's, that's trying to, that's like, saying what I was trying to get out which is That could enable the flight crew to choose an option.

27:44

That they desperately seeking to be available to them. Yeah. But it would also give them the option to Risk assess. Like that. This is not. Yeah, this is not. Yeah, not recommended. Yeah, you don't have to do something just because the manual says you can do it. Yeah, exactly.

27:59

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SOPs

It's not. It's sometimes, I'm gonna. Yeah, yeah, I agree. So We talked about FCOM A,B,C,D, the MEL, what so what about SOPs was in, like, what are they and what, you know, gotta be the most well read. Part of all those manuals by a pilot. Yeah, it's incredible. Really SOPs.

28:17

I think, especially when I talk to people outside of Aviation And I say, they say to me, are you going flying today? Yeah. He, you know, you flying with. No, no never met them before. What's you're going to go? Meet somebody and then just go fly, an aeroplane with them.

28:31

Like yeah. How do you do that? Well, what we have SOPs standard operating procedures. And yeah, i mean it is amazing, really, if you take yourself out side of aviation and think That you could literally turn up at work. Meet someone, for the very first time, you don't know anything about them.

28:49

But an hour later your your flying an aeroplane with them. It's like, An actor from a musical. On one side of the world. Standing in for somebody. On what's the one in New York called? What Broadway? Brought an actor from music on Broadway? Who's never met the guy in the West End, He standing in.

29:10

With no rehearsal whatsoever. Yeah, and they have to dance And together for two hours. Yeah. And sing together for two hours. And yet there's flawless. Yeah, yeah, every light no line is missed. No beat no, no step in the dance is missed at all because the SOPs are so well rehearsed.

29:30

Yeah, yeah. And I do think it's a part of our manual. That is very well written and probably less Less ambiguous in the SOPs. I don't think there's many SOPs, that are open to interpretation and like, Maybe statements in OMA, or you get these things on the line, where one pilots, And you and that their few and far between where, where half the fleet of pilots interpret.

29:53

Its one way and the other half the other way. Yeah. And it becomes like a little comedy or wonder which way they're going to say that line or something. Yeah. It but usually if that's something rears it head like that, then training managers are generally quite quickly quickly to quash it in some sort of publication of Either a safety, you know, a safety report or a notice or because if it doesn't if it doesn't become dealt with yeah or worse.

30:19

If there's something that isn't that, it's that the entire fleet interprets. Let's call it the wrong way. Yeah, to how it was intended. They're not following the SOP basically. And it becomes what? Some cool like, a normalisation of deviance . Yeah, which is So, a lot of accidents you're looking at, And although the manual said to do it this way, everybody just did it this other way.

30:46

Yeah. And that was one of the layers of the Swiss cheese that cause the accident. Yeah. And it's so normal to do it the wrong way. Yeah, that You don't even know that you're doing it the wrong way. No. I'm trying to think on the an old fleet on the 757, the recirculation fans that call the You know, avion exercising was, so noisey.

31:08

The on turnaround, Everyone would just reach up and turn them off in them off. There's no way that's allowed under any of the manuals was however, and who knows what kind of, you know, accidents that could allow a path towards. Yeah. And that's just a minor example. But it was so normal.

31:23

You know how I feel about speeding and on roads? Yeah, the rule is you don't exceed the speed limit. Yeah, I don't know. 999 out of a thousand people. Wouldn't lose an ounce of sleep over the fact that they sped 40 in a 30 or something, the day before, even police officers and so on.

31:41

Yeah, because to me that's like a normalisation of something, that's different, that's different. Maybe a whole Podcast episode could be on SOPs. And yeah. It's probably use and theory of them. Yeah. You talking about their well-written. Not open to interpretation. It. Today I'll include things like The calls. To the letter that you say yeah.

32:03

In the flight deck to the point where Boeing say that the word check. Is American. So, Have we got the fuel on board “check” means, yes, yeah, but in European manual, check means you need to check that and checked means it was checked, you know, so they can be that specific and they include the things.

32:26

You say the buttons, you press the order, you do it in basically chronologically as you progress through the flight, but we don't see there with the manual open. No. We just know them inclusively. Yeah. That's one of the things that you there's drawn into your Training that you have to learn the SOPs.

32:41

Absolutely 100%. Here, you can't be. Referring to them in the middle of not be referring to the SOP on how to fly a non-precision approach. While she flying an non precision approach in. Yeah, you need to know it really And then if you have a big SOP change, It's really annoying and stressful.

32:58

Yeah. Yeah. Because it's sick because the brain. Wants to follow the path of least resistance and so it knows. Every little muscle in the mouth. How to say the checklist? Yeah. Be must never do the checklist from memory. Your brain is begging you to. Please do it for a memory so I don't have to pick up the checklist.

33:17

It's like save every little Calorie. Yep. And every SOP is Is like efficient to to a pilot because they know them inside out, they don't have to think. About the SOP and then when they're suddenly changed everyone needs to think. Yeah. And that's annoying. Yeah. Uses precious energy that was become like a muscle memory, like the SOP?

33:38

Yeah. Other things to talk about which was it was only really I took about this is it was an example of what comes at the day and We've talked about discrepancies and things open to interpretation. But there are Engineers. He look after our plane, they've got a different set of manuals and generally, they all marry up, but there's sometimes there are like huge.

33:59

Discrepancies and the engineer is manuals says, completely different to what our manual. So the example of the day there was It doesn't MEL item for one of the those bit fluctuating in one of the outer tanks to fuel. So the MEL says that after every refuelled either the tanks need to be dipped by an engineer to check the fuel on board.

34:22

Oh, you have to go and read the gauges from the refuelling panel on the belly of the aircraft. That's what the MEL said, either raw. That an engineer arrived is like, hey guys, I've come to dip the fuel tanks. All right, it's okay. We don't we don't need you.

34:34

We don't it this way and he was like, no, you can't do it that way. The engineering manual says, it has to be tanks dipped. All right, so there is errors in manuals and discrepancies and Engineers have manuals cabin cooperating manuals. There's always going to be It's like differences.

34:53

I just throw that in there as an example of But then, if you've looked at any accidents, Um, but the, the all the ones I wanted to use is example, was where the engineers had made mistakes interpreting the manuals. You're not where pilots had. Yeah, I think was really fair.

35:09

No, and for the spirit of this, but Very recently. There was an A321, at Gatwick. Which almost had a double engine failure, right? A Titan airways. Okay. I don't know about this, but it was a mistaken engineer had made by using, like a thousand times too much. Of a bioside which cleans out the fuel tanks then they should have, Wow.

35:31

Due to Less than rigorous use of the maintenance manual, and some assumptions made and some interpretation errors . You know, like spacecraft that have crashed because one person was in metres and one was in feet or something like that. You know, something along those lines and I found plenty of those.

35:48

I mean, remember Gatwick again, and you remember the pilot that got sucked half sucked out of the window? Yeah, the engineered replace the window with the wrong bolts on bolts. Yeah, mind you identify. That was An interpretationary on the manual, but all the ones it came to me were maintenance.

36:04

Reading the maintenance manual. Yeah, in error. Yeah. And In my old airline, we used to have the maintenance manual. So, i don't want to get to boring, but you'd have a defect, and you'd be like, right? Okay. So can we get back to the UK? So you're looking at your MEL, Yes, you can but there's a maintenance procedure that it must be done by an engineer basically.

36:25

So What is it? So, we would be able to see what they have to do. I don't understand necessarily, but I can understand generically what what's involved Might you know involve something significant or you know you can now we don't have that access that manual anymore So I don't know.

36:44

I can't think ahead about what they're maintenance has required to take. So that part of the need to know, nice to know. Yeah. Or potentially dangerous to know you because, you know, it might say, just going clean the sensor and you know, I can do that. I could do that or you might see an engineer doing it and then in a couple years time, you get the same 14.

37:03

You I've seen this done before, I've seen. Yeah, in fact in my previous airline we were training pilots to do two or three, basic engineering things, One of them was bird strike inspection. Okay, one was CB Reset. Okay. And there was another one. Yeah, because there's not always an engineer where you go in.

37:22

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The Manuals Sat Next To You

Yeah. We've kind of covered, broadly, the layout and Fact that there's a lot of information, it has to be interpreted, you have to know your SOPs. I think you're right. A whole, an episode and SOPs would be Would be useful. Anything anything else? Any other topics? You think we should be covering a manuals.

37:44

I think, I just want to get across to If it was ATPL student, just what the manuals, come to mean to you in your career, which is sometimes you'll feel like The captain is wrong. Sometimes you might even feel like the training captain is wrong. And they may or may not be more into understand furthery moment.

38:03

A question people, sometimes you might feel like you whole airline or your whole Aviation Authorities. Got it wrong. Yeah. And the manually is What you can sleep at night with if you want as like a young pilot, you know, you can really get to know the manual and often you will understand the manual inside out and the line captain that you're with won't And have kept up to date with it like they might of and but they will have the context to add to it.

38:30

And so these manuals and your relationship with them over the years, is kind of interesting. And if you're young and enthusiastic like it's really, you're only source of like go to What will you read the manual? Again, is because you as a new pilot, you haven't got the experience.

38:44

So them, so you've got, but you've got the knowledge or access to the knowledge. So, whereas a someone who's been flying for 20 years, it's got loads of experience. And it's probably less reliant on the manuals because they've I think, yeah, that's all you got to go to as a new pilot is the manuals because you haven't seen it before, you haven't got the experience.

39:02

So The manual is a tool just like lots of other things that you're use as a pilot. Like humans the manuals can be flawed. Yeah. So I'd say to any Any new pilot that. Embrace like any enthusiasm. You've got by reading the manuals but the greatest manual that you've got is the one set next year on the flight deck.

39:22

Yeah. And if you can, Keep up your Enthusiasm. Use that experience that sat next year as like a manual that you can flick through. Yeah. And talk to you about your understanding, the operation in conjunction with year, interpretation of the written text. Yep. Then you'll be working as a professional.

39:40

Yeah. Sounds good. All right. Okay, Cheers. Bye.

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Airline Pilot Technical Theory Adam Howey Airline Pilot Technical Theory Adam Howey

TCAS

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What Is TCAS

Sam. Adam. TCAS. Yeah, traffic collision. No. Traffic alerting. Traffic alert and collision avoidance system. Yeah, that's it. Which is a type of ACAS, Airborne collision avoidance system. That's the only one really until maybe some time in the future, which we might talk about. How recently have you had a TCAS RA?

00:29

Resolution Advisory I have had one or two. Where was it? Obviously flying into Amsterdam. And it was a surprise, you not really, because we could almost see the traffic coming and it look very close to us and it wasn't actually An aggressive RA.

00:47

It was actually what was the command the command was monitor, vertical speed. So basically just to fly level, right? Destruction was to carry on flying level, where we were Yeah, so it was pretty young eventful, but we obviously went through the whole process of save the day, did it?

01:01

Yeah, this guy went underneath this about 400 feet. Wow. I could say I'm all the way it was a king. Was like a king air. Okay, but, yeah, just going down the beach. We were on approaching to AMS Amsterdam. What did the Dutch have to say about that? They weren’t very interested really.

01:15

I told him that we had a TCAS RA. Told him that it was because he could hear the guy on frequency. Let's say just like yeah, we'll put in a report , rewind then TCA. Yeah, what is it? Traffic. No. But what is it? Oh, what is that? Sorry. So well, what's it done for you?

01:35

So it's It's an avoidance system built into the aircrafts transponder. Of all aircraft with mode. Charlie, with altitude information can have TCAS, and TCAS to talk to each other. So, That they can issue instructions between aircraft. They can interrogate each other and talk to each other and provide avoiding action.

02:00

To prevent to prevent a midair collision basically? Yeah, it's a tool for preventing mid-air. Mid air collision . So like, mid air collision loss of separation. One of the biggest. Categories of aircraft accidents. Yep. I think TCAS has done a good job of Definitely keep an accident rates in that category way down. Yeah.

02:23

So I think TCAS was made mandatory in about 2000s. I think in European airspace and apart from the one accident which we're going to talk about, what could that be? So, that would be the mid air collision over the German Swiss border Uberlingen, okay? Part from that one. I can't really think of any other.

02:45

Mid-air collisions. Between between aircraft that have been equipped with TCAS. Yeah. Okay. So surprises me that it was only mandated after the 2000s. Yeah, I think it was 2000. It was mandated. Yeah, pretty successful system. You like it? Yeah, yeah, I do. Yeah, I love it. It's pretty simple.

03:07

Yeah, and it's only there as a backup. If a mistake by pilot or air traffic control, Yeah it's labelled as a safety net. So yeah GPWS Ground Proximately warning system being another one TCAS. A safety, net being almost as if all other Possibilities to catch that accident have failed.

03:27

And this is the last thing that's going to Save you apart from the pilot being the The inbuilt traffic collision avoidance system if you like. We can always prevent an accident but TCAS is a safety net. There, You've told me it's to stop as hitting another aircraft from what airborne?

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03:42

What does TCAS do

Yeah. So practically What does it look like to you when you had your TCAS? So it built up our situational awareness as well, even without issuing warnings or advisories because it displays other aircraft on our navigation display. In form of a little diamond. So you can look at your map.

04:00

See other aircraft that are that are equipped with TCAS. And you can see where they are in relationship to you and what altitude above or below. So, what use is that and Well, it's good for your own awareness. Particularly in like a busy TMA around an airfield, you can Building up your situation awareness as to where you might be in the sequence for approach, where are the traffic is?

04:25

If you're maybe requesting further climber a traffic aren't giving it to you, you can maybe see the reason why because there's traffic above you, that's about to cross. So front of you, So actively we're actually using it most of the time. Yeah. For not what it was designed for.

04:40

Yeah. Exactly. I mean it is designed to raise your SA but you're looking okay. The person in fronts two and a half miles in front of me on the approach. If you get any closer that's going to be a go around close, you're saying I want to climb out this table in this but I can't because somebody's I can see somebody 2000 feet above me.

04:56

That's going to cross in front of us in the next two or three minutes. So it's like on our ND moving map kind of crudely. We almost have like the air traffic control is radar. Yeah exactly. Yeah. Except that it's not as cluttered because it only gives us certain aircraft depending on how we've got it set and Yeah.

05:16

What we thinks relevant to us. Okay, so what when we get more involved in it, what happens next? Then I suppose so it goes from a hollow sort of white diamond. The next sort of phase if you like if you're getting quite close to another potential conflict or potentially intruder, The the diamond gets coloured in.

05:35

So it's now like a solid white. That diamond and that is It's essentially potentially intruder. This that see that yeah, coming quite close to us in terms of literally, or vertically or their rate, whatever rate their climbing or descending out, or your climate, go to sending out is a potential.

05:54

Conflicts make quite proximate traffic. That's right. Yeah. So that would, that definitely draws your attention to the navigation display. I find if you see one, you see, one go coloured in. What would you do then? Okay, you can see proximate traffic. Yes. So again great tool for situational awareness.

06:13

That makes you think, right? That somebody close to us approximate traffic. So I might adjust my rate of climb my rate of descent. If it's particularly excessive, I might look at the window. To see if I can see them. So again, yeah, probably share your mental model with your.

06:29

Yeah, exactly. Say, have you seen that? I've seen that look. We've got traffic there. Even ATC, sometimes might point out that there's traffic. And your traffic in your one o'clock while thousand feet above. So it's raising or you giving your opportunity to raise your SA. Maybe think ahead about what might be next.

06:49

Possibly silently review the TCAS manoeuvre. Should it happen, Okay, so what what would happen next? So the next level would be a traffic advisory at TA and in this case, the little white diamond would turn to a orange diamond and then the system the TCAS system would then call out to you.

07:10

That i'm not going to do the impression. You have to “traffic traffic”. That's really good. Thank you, sort of an American accent. Traffic traffic, that definitely gets you attention. Yeah. So that would if not already that would draw both pilots, every airline will have different operating procedures but There will be possibly, some sort of call then between the pilots as to Who is at least in control of the aircraft or Some sort of separate procedure to almost get them ready for what may come next.

07:40

Should you manoeuvre? Now based on that? No, Well, I mean every airline might be different but I think Some airlines you might be told to maybe adjust your rates, but Other airlines will say no just Really don't don't interfere. Basically, just leave or preparing and just prepare for what may or may not.

08:01

Come next, Somebody looking for the traffic. Yeah, so one generally, one pilot will start looking out for the traffic whilst the other. There is looking in on the navigation displaying and getting ready for the manoeuvre. You know, what's next? So then the final level, which if it gets to that it is resolutionary advisory.

08:19

So, resolution advisory RA. So That's when I think the diamond goes to a square. I think you're right. Red square. Right. This all being an airbus, this is all air bus. Yeah. Obviously. And then you'll get some instruction basically from TCAS and the TCAS will actually tell you What to do and as a could be a simple as Climb.

08:40

Climb this and descends. Monitor vertical speed adjust vertical speed. Increased climb. Decrease climb. Few others as well probably. But the systems are we talking to each other? So the other aircraft may or may not get an instruction Sometimes. One, aircraft can get an RA, was the other record of trying to gets a TA.

08:58

All right, all right. So, Just stop us. Hitting another aircraft? Yep. It's a safety. Net should be the last thing. Really that saves us. That's what it looks like to a pilot. I'd say it's pretty simple works really well. It's very simple system and it does work very well and we practice it a lot in the simulator Probably over practiced it really for the actual amount that we not over practice it but we do it a lot considering.

09:22

Well, yeah, how you've had one in one and 13 years. Yeah, for two maybe things might have been tea, definitely had one into pafos. Because, airspace basis. Don't talk to each other there and people are trying to use high rates of climb to reach there. Cruise level. So, If we have an RA in the Airbus and it's pretty similar and all fleet, it's just like a really simple memory item for us to do.

09:46

Yeah, remember . What the memory item is the actions. So the actions would be to disconnect the autopilot. I'm turning off the flight directors. I'm so two reasons for that on the Airbus. Of obviously because you don't you not going to be following the flight direct just anymore. You can be following the TCAS instruction but also it reverts the thrust mode to speed mode on.

10:07

Yeah, on an airbus. So autopilot off flight, directly soft. And then following the TCAS into the green band, which is The TCAS kind of takes over your VSI, your vertical speed indicator. I know have big chunk of red and a little chunk of green. And it wants you to basically aim for the green.

10:24

So whether that's climb descent or maintain, and you should manoeuvre the aircraft into the green band. Of the way I train it is. And smoothly. But promptly so it's not it's not like a It's not yanking her But how simple is that? So green. Good, red bad. Yeah, exactly.

10:44

Definitely all pilot. Yeah, should be pretty simple for a pilot degree. Keep the authorised in. Yeah, and just just do it and just following, it didn't worry about anything else. Yeah, exactly. So it's Really simple in a really good way, really effective system. Yeah, I'm really happy with it as a system.

11:04

It's not even something that I'm sort of scared of. I don't like a GPWS but TCAS any day. Yeah, definitely that makes sense. And I think Taken into another level talking about, you know, passages on board in the commercial environment. I imagine if you had a TCSRA It's not that violence and manoeuvre.

11:24

I don't think mostly Some people have mentioned seatbelt. So it's not part of manoeuvre and I don't think they really need to know. So, is there any horizontal? Thing you need to do. In terms of well, the whole system is vertically based, which is genius. Yeah, it doesn't require you to turn left or right.

11:43

And if you're in a turn in the question is, what do you do? It? Don't matter. Yeah, he's just got a resolve, it vertically This genius and smoothly and promptly just inside the green band. If you even at high altitudes especially on a fly by wire aircraft. If you kind of Blip the side stick, you're going to end up in that green band quite quickly and smoothly, really Know.

12:04

is genius and am I right in thinking, you have four seconds to react. It might be, I think it's four seconds to react to an initial RA. Yeah, which is quite a long time, really. And if We'll talk about this maybe in a minute, a reversion. You have two seconds to react.

12:22

Yeah. Yeah. That's right. So I supposed to talk about now. So, reversion would be If either one aircraft, maybe wasn't. Following the TCAS or possibly you are Your climb climb, takes you into the path. Another aircraft. The different aircraft going above. You might get a reversion which then says, descend descend.

12:42

So you might actually swap completely what you're doing. And the green band has gone from right at the top of the VSI, your climbing to write the bottom. He has to be a bit quicker on reacting to a reversion because things are I forget the, the makes us sound pretty cool.

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12:57

Why TCAS, History

If anybody got four seconds to react but, you know, being possible not to do it really. It. So, As air traffic increased, call it in the 50s. But it was very famous mid-air collision over the Grand Canyon Which is when the FAA decided that they needed something to prevent mid-air collisions, okay?

13:16

But obviously, if you were going to increase air traffic volume significantly and mid-air collisions of factor, it has to be reduced to like near zero because The physics of the situation mean that any mid-air collision is basically always going to be catastrophic. Though, you know, in America they have a lot of mixing of like general and airliner aircraft as well into all sorts of airfields, which is like less.

13:40

I'm always surprised when I go to America, you know. Yeah. But although in Amsterdam You get our light aircraft. Yeah. Scoot and underneath you. And that's exactly what our situation was. I don't, I forget the exact details but I'm pretty sure the other aircraft and it was only yes that got the got the RA but going back you know they to come up with a system that works this.

14:02

Well was taking a long time but actually they developed it quite early on First they want to like a ground based system. And it was actually called be CAS and was like a beacon based system but I mean doesn't work over the sea Does it? And also there was issues with how busy the beacons would be.

14:19

And that's a big part of this is the the data that has to be transmitted rapidly between the aircraft. And then you imagine some of these systems were designed a long time ago and it has to compute Very quickly if there's going to be an accident but the airspace is so busy.

14:33

I mean, it must be computing all the time. Yeah and initially when TCAS was implemented, there was a lot of nuisance and you could even say spurious. Triggers of the system, which is not good because empires Blend that it was annoying and maybe not to follow us. I mean, people are getting them off boats that have transponders, right?

14:54

And this kind of thing, right? Yeah. But eventually, we’ve up with this like incredibly robust. Airborne collision avoidance system which may be superceded sometime in the future. Now, ADSB is coming out but still going to use basically the same principles that we've been using for. I don't know, like 40 years, the years.

15:14

Well, we know, yes, something like that. And then i think you're a control. Reckon, it's Decrease the chance of airborne collision by like a factor of five. Out Most of saved. A lot of lives, definitely, and I think Pilots now our generation pilots definitely love the system. And it's so good that it's actually the nuances of Of it which of course problems which is because it's such high density traffic.

15:40

Situation that we're flying through. Now, the systems just needs tweak in every so slightly just to stop as it being so annoying. So the fact that it's safe isn't even in question. Yeah. So yeah, I mean, I don't know if you remember the mid-air accolision that sticks in my mind, is the cessna that hit an aircraft in the circuit in the states and then there's a picture of San Diego.

16:02

And it was as a picture of the southwest airliner. I can't remember if it was a DC9 like on inflames going down this booty have visual contact with that right with that session 172. Okay? And they think there's a lot of confirmation like oh yeah he's gone that way or whatever and it's actually underneath them.

16:21

That was like, 144 people. There was another DC9 with, like, 80 people who died in the 80s, but this is when TCAS, basically different been developed, but then it was like accelerated. And then by the end of the 80s, we had we had like the the TCAS system Almost that we know now.

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16:40

Faults

So, It's really simple for us to use works really well. Any idiot could kind of grasp it in a few, a few minutes. However, like most of these systems, if you, it's good, if you know the memory drills, I mean, you have to not good, it's mandatory. But if you just understand slightly deeper, The system that will give you a much safer use of it And I'm only talking just scratch the surface of it.

17:05

So yeah, if you just fly in the green you'll be safe. But a couple of things like the RT and how air traffic controller involved, if you just slightly understand that That's going to prevent. Potential accidents. Which ubiling in was in there was a mix of conflict. Yeah, so my understanding now, is that extra control if someone reports TCAS RA air traffic control will just sit back and not try and issue.

17:28

Yeah my experience is totally the opposite. Really? Honestly it's totally the opposite. I found the controllers really defensive, okay. So they start talking and they start saying, no, no, it's not a problem. The bottom line is once TCSRA. Activates yeah. You ignore ATC even if they're screaming at you, even if they said Ignore TCAS.

17:55

The the law aviator Air Law is that you were follow that TCAS system. So my questions you is uberlingham was 2002. Yeah. Was that in was that made law after uberlingen or was it? It was definitely the law in the procedure joining uberlingen and however, Thing about air law is depends where you are?

18:15

Yeah, well yeah yeah was was depends whether things are standardised. And the Russians had a different idea. So the RT you need to know your RT as part of the memory action, Like to the letter. And you need to be able to What makes like, Always gone about unreliable speed.

18:36

I mean, you always do what air traffic control says but this is the one Chance. You've got a snap out of however many years of listening to our traffic control and go. No. Because in some countries they will ignore you tell you to ignore tcas , something like that.

18:50

The other thing is, That in any other situation. Don't say TCAS. Which is a really bad habit that pilots have gotten here all the time. Yeah. So you said that. When you see proximate traffic, You'll start looking for them. Next minute, air traffic control to be helpful, say others crossing traffic that and they you will always hear people read back.

19:12

Yeah, we've got him on TCAS. Yeah, but the word the phrase TCAS should only be used when you in an RA manoeuvre. Yes, that's right. Yes, yes. It doesn't help. Yeah, because that changed as well. Didn't it? And so, so, yeah. So I have to sort of consciously So say just copied.

19:27

Thank you. Yeah. Yeah you can say we visual or visual or even though when you IMC, I guess because you so anything but TCAS I'm yeah, don't say the word TCAS, I guess everybody. Oh, it doesn't, but it should get everybody's like blood pressure at basically, everyone should get that startle factor.

19:47

So that's our safety. Net air traffic control, have their own safetinets. They have like short-term collision avoidance, which is a bit of a wider. A time that the radar system will predict things like their own TCAS but yeah it's a bit it's two and a half minutes in advance of an ever.

20:06

Collision collision. And now we're moving into aircraft that will fly the tcas manoeuvre for you. Yeah, we already have that. Yeah, I'm so talking as if it's the future but it's on A350 A380. Obviously it'll just fly the manoeuvre. So, We've got high performance aircraft now especially like a hear the seven, three, 737 max is just so powerful, so you've got we've now got really high rates of climb aircraft when sometimes we don't want them, especially an upper air space and in RVSM air space, so TCAS.

20:43

Doesn't know. What we're intending to do even though the FMS does know, we're going to go into an out capture mode. So TCAS, now, often tells us off It when it thinks we're going to have a collision when we know full well, we're going to level off. Yes. And say that's something that probably will be developed into future versions of airborne collision avoidance system.

21:06

Of preventions better than cure, right? So not having high rates of climb. Is the most. Is your biggest defence against having a t-cast most of the time, because I think 80% of TCAS RAs, Are. Preventative RAs. Yes. As that make sense and they're reducing ours, IE, you've got a high rate of climb towards the level off.

21:29

It's just asking you to reduce your rate of climb, reduce your rate of descent, which you said earlier early versions of TCS actually that all warning was reduce climb But people would always go the wrong way because they'd hear the word climb. Yeah. So then they changed it to adjust vertical speed adjust, right?

21:47

Which always meant reduce vertical speed but that was too ambiguous. So now we just have “level off”. Yeah. So it used to say, oh, choose a lower vertical speed, like, you doing 3,000 feet a minute. So just choose 1500, but now they've sacked it all off. And it just tells you to level up leveller because it's Because it's easier pilots understand that.

22:07

Yeah so it stops you climbing order to send him just for a minute and then Say it was a major problem for a while that the most common RA was for you to adjust vertical speed. But a significant proportion of pilots would go the wrong way. Wrong way, not into the green.

22:25

And the other thing is they'd overreact, So it's smoothly and promptly just inside the green band, but they'd go. They'd have the start of factor, I guess. Just they remember uberlingen, and they'd go for it. All stick. And then, as you've already said, then they cause a another RA with another level, because they go too hard.

22:44

Yeah. Yeah. But I thought you manual actually says, just into the green band. Yeah, that's your goal or just out of the redband in my even second. Okay. Yeah, exactly. So TCAS is so good. We're sort of creating a little issues within the system of TCS. So having some sort of understanding a belief, the surface of how it works.

23:05

And how it interacts with ATC, definitely makes it even safer system. But it but it works really well. One. One little thing that I wanted to mention earlier, which I forgot about building up our situational awareness. You know, looking at the navigation display was the accident that happened in Milan Linate.

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23:25

Linate Airport Disaster

I remember oh, like this. Yeah. So His first tragic, really, there was a private jet, which was Somewhere where it didn't think it was. It was like this foggy day. I can't remember how long ago. This was probably 20 years ago. Up by essentially. In the low phase, this private jet thought it was on a taxi labour, It was actually on the active runway.

23:49

A traffic control. Cleared Scandinavian SAS to take off. And unfortunately the SAS hit the private jet. They had a collision on the runway. Big fireball, but because of the low vision of the fog, nobody knew that the crash had happened. Even after control couldn't see from their position that a crash had happened.

24:09

And they actually, then cleared, the next aircraft to take off, which was a left answer. And the left hands refused to accept the takeoff clearance because his SA was so high that he hadn't seen the magenta of the white diamond of the SAS like get airborne. So you know he would have seen it say yeah.

24:30

Plus zero one plus zero two. So yeah. So he refused the takeoff clearance because he said that German situational NS yeah. And i think tcas is used same much like reigning up on anything. Yeah. And especially low visit. It's very useful. For the SA now in the so with ADSB, automatic dependence valence broadcast, aircraft, that can accept that information onto their ND.

24:57

They have like a They have like an enhanced, what you would say, Ticest display tells you Might be wrong about this. I think it tells you to call sign and the type okay and the altitude probably wrong about one of these but really, really enhances your SA that information is coming from the ADSB which is different to TCAS but a future generations of TCAS.

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Future

25:23

I probably going to use. ADSB. So, the problems always been since time began, which is How do you solve the problems of? CNS, communication, navigation and surveillance. So, we've already done a podcast on A communicate, we VHF and some of the limitations of that VHF is on radio. Communication is, is a really old system, but works really well and that's one of the That's one of the main defences against aircraft.

25:51

Collisions is just read backs. You know, it's just it's just talking to air traffic control and coordinating everything. Yeah, navigation. Obviously, we used to use radio beacons and now we're moving towards. And performance base navigation. So Where we are in in space and time the aircraft now, knows better.

26:13

Then the ground knows because of our GPS input. So we can not from the ground but from the aircraft, we can tell other aircraft where Where we are better than we used to be able to. So with ADSB, We can have a like, a more accurate TCAS because a GPS position, basically is so accurate and then surveillance used to be done by.

26:33

This yet primary radar. Which would like, you know, developed in World War, I would would ping back if it be a dot on a screen. Yeah. And then you've got secondary radar, which uses the transponder. So if you interrogate a transponder, it decides, whether to send back information, like, yeah, I'm here and it can have lots of information sent with it, but definitely sends back, it's it's altitude .

26:56

And that's what TCAS uses, which is transponder. But the use of adsb in the future, He's going to just mean it's like broadband for aircraft. Basically, Lots more data travelling between the aircraft other aircraft and the ground. And say all this airborne collision of avoidance systems are going to probably start to use that.

27:16

And then if you think about like drones, like if they had ADSB on, you can have a TCAS against the drone. Yeah. You know whether it was supposed to be there or not whether it's just You know, what is already? A very sort of safe system. It's probably only gonna get even safer and even better.

27:31

They did get to. So TCAS 2 is what we're talking about. TCAS is just TAs and it was some regional aircraft had that but TCAS 3 was supposed to come in at some point and had horizontal resolutions but basically you don't need them because everything can be solved vertically.

27:50

Yeah but with I think it's called ACAS x at the moment is what they're calling it. That's like the next generation of airborne Collision of avoidance system because That's the umbrella term TCAS is almost like the brand name. So, if something else can solve airborne collision avoidance, that will come under the same umbrellas, it'll be some changes in the future, but the point I'm making is ever our sa .

28:11

A situation awareness that's coming from this pretty rudimentary like, pings from transponders. He's going to be enhanced by a ADSB and It's like a, it's so many layers of cheese in front of the, actually, using the TCAS system that keeps us safe. Yeah, other things, air traffic control, you know, like, they don't know, we've got an RA, but now we have the ability maybe to download it to them and it pings the same.

28:35

We've got an RA. Yeah, and so be all sorts of changes to it, but all these things have to be You know, I think they're basically proposing to change nothing as far as the pilot is concerned because the simpler the better. Yeah. You don't mess with it. Yeah. But the algorithms that run in the in the TCAS haven't been changed since the 80s but now the computer power is so much better.

28:57

You can have much more accurate computations about closest point of approach and stuff like that. It's definitely some changes come in. But as far as we're concern hopefully I'll just be flying the green. Yeah, stupid. Simple for us. Yeah, first pilots. So I think what we're going to talk about now Is how it managed to go wrong.

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29:18

Überlingen Mid-Air Collision

Yeah. Even they taste was well in truly involved in the accident. Yeah, the sad sad story of uberlingen is sort of referred to as the uberlingen crash, but yeah, uberlingen was the town on the ground. On the Swiss German border. On Lake Constance, where the debris of the aircraft fell.

29:37

Yeah, you've maybe done a little more research than this on this to me I sort of Feel like I know this story quite well. And this obviously world documented on Natural, geographic air crash investigation. You know, this quite a lot of stuff out there on it but You want to broadly so talk about.

29:55

Yeah happened. It is well documented because it's very dramatic. And like,, there's been plenty of films. Including did you know an Arnold Schwarzenegger film? About this about this. I think I might have known that. Yeah, I didn't know that. So I need to watch it. Now it's loosely based.

30:13

On, on this. It's a 2017, but Yeah. It's no. What's it called? I've written it down. I feel like I might even seen it. Aftermath. And did Arnold Schwarzenegger play the controller think? Maybe. Yeah, I've seen it. I've got feeling I might even seen it. Well, But I need to watch it.

30:33

Yeah. So, It's well known. It's, it's Dramatic in its in that sense, it's addictive. So there's a lot of films and podcasts and That plays and whatever, all written about it. Likes. You see after learning about it again. I think probably last time I learn about it was pretty me being an airline pilot as always becoming an airline pilot.

30:58

It's really given me. It gives me that. And, But i are basically lose. Sleepover it? Yeah. And because Our routine day job, which I'd like to say take incredibly seriously still leaves you a bit disconnected from the reality of what you do in sometimes or what could go wrong.

31:21

Yeah. I don't think it changes anything about your approach to the job. But, Definitely gives it a bit more. Makes it a bit more vivid, so, Like you said, do you like first 2002? Of aircraft taking off from Moscow, to go to barcelona. With 45 children on board as well as other people.

31:43

The school trip. Wasn't I think or yes school trips Barcelona. Yes. The children had like one their place on this trip. And for their achievements. And i also they probably been picked because they had well connected parents and bear that in mind. So, they're going to Barcelona in the evening and Like sliding doors or whatever but they're they'd missed one of their connections or it been late and this was especially charted to get them there without delay.

32:12

So the air line, the Russian airline Bashkirian. Yeah there you go. And they're flying, the Tupolev Tu-154. Which is amazing Russian aircraft that they basically had to build and design in Russia during the cold war and fly around Russia. And it's actually designed to go in like rough strips, can like land on gravel and stuff even though suggest aircraft is like, super high performance, they had like a thousand of them in Russia.

32:39

So I guess the Russians loved it, really? A little try. Try jet. Try engine thing. I don't think I've ever really been in close to it any of these things and well, they were still flying until About 2010 are likely things. So, This airline no small outfit had about 33 aircraft okay, maybe like 13 of these four of them on the flight deck.

33:03

It's a training flight and flight. Yeah. So you captain left-hand seat and the chief pilot in the right hand sea, How many times in these accidents? Is it like some combinations? Like that? Some yeah, they have a flight engineer and for no reason. There's a copilot super numerary so I don't know why he's in the flight deck but There's even some.

33:23

Ambiguity about who the piloting command was. And I You know, i just throw that in there as to whether that is any kind of contribution. So maybe, yeah. As to So they're going towards Barcelona, it has to be a training flight because I say, I guess they think Barcelona is so crazy which it is and they captain has to have two supervised visits for they go.

33:42

So that's why they're chief pilots going. Okay. But there experience flying outside of Russia is like really limited like they've only done a handful of trips each I think they're chief pilots only been outside, Russian territory twice, right? Or something but he's checking out the captain to get Barcelona.

33:59

So even there experience outside , so Russia. Is slightly limited. Meanwhile, DHL 757, we've only two people, two pilots on boards, taking off from Bergamo. And to fly north over the Alps to Brussels, and then imagine that this Russian aircraft is coming, kind of southwest generally towards Barcelona from Russia.

34:20

And it's late in the evening by the time they get towards this piece of airspace, it's about 11 o'clock at night. So, At any about halfway through the Russian sector, maybe about two hours to land in. Not long. After space, the DHL would have grab one the captain of the DHL British.

34:40

Yeah. And a Canadian first officer 757. So at this point in in history, yeah, the DHL have Had. TCAS for a while and they like you said have been training it in the simulator a lot. And so they may or may not have had one in real life, but in every check, they're doing their.

35:01

Yeah. Now If the Russian airlines want to fly outside of Russia, they have to have TCAS because as you said is been mandated, yeah, about the time in the millennium but in Russia you don't have to have TCAS. So, The Russian aircraft has got TCAS. It's been fitted. However The pilots have and the Navigator, the sorry, the flight engineer have done the I want to say CBT (computer based training).

35:27

They've done the That they've ticked a box somewhere that says, they've done the learning. They've done the learning , They've never done one in the simulator because guess what? The simulator doesn't have TCAS fitted to it. And there it's their exposure to TCAS is like incredibly limited like, The amount of sectors, whether even done a flight with TCAS on board is like a hand like, very, very few.

35:51

So, That's his aircraft approach. This piece of airspace, Simsuric controllers. Below. And well, there's one actually bases. One, this is another factors that it's always, massive is always the holes of the Swiss cheese and they left the Swiss cheese. Well, so this this unit used to always have three controllers on And it became, Common.

36:19

That the controllers would take it upon themselves to for one of the three to just sleep for the entire shift. Because then as they alternate day after day, one of them's, getting a free, a free night sleep, and then on these deep night shifts, Then due to personnel limitations, there was only two in the control room, shift?

36:40

Yeah. And for, however, long that had been going on, but still, the controllers had decided that they one of them would still sleep for the entire shift. There's only one On duty. The same time maintenance returned up, they're like “yeah, we need to do some maintenance on the, on the old radar there”.

36:58

Yep. To the radar goes into this thing called backup made, I think or degraded mode. Another hole in the Swiss cheese. Okay? An integrated mode. The radar can only do seven miles of separation, rather than five and unbeknown to the controller. The STCA short-term collision avoidance visual warning, which goes off at two and a half minutes prior to collision.

37:26

Doesn't work, doesn't work. But all one that goes off 30 seconds prior to collision does work. Now, there's a little airport down there, which I've flown into called Friedrichshafen on Lake Constance, Add This controller also has to do the area control for that. So guide the aircraft in onto the ILS, basically.

37:47

Um, but no problem because it's 11 o'clock at night and Friedrichshafen doesn't have any inbound traffic. It's part from some little airbus shows up and says I’m late and needs like vectors towards Friedrichshafen. He does that. He's working two radar screens. I think it looks like two stations.

38:03

Yeah. And So, A DHL request climb 360 and the Russian aircraft is at 360. Yeah. So, The controller is trying to co-ordinate the fact that two aircraft are going to be at 360 because he delays one of them That the climb for a minute and he's trying to get into touch with Friedrichshafen tower.

38:27

To hand over this airbus. He's coming into land. But every time he tries to use the phone, it's not working. And I don't know if that's due to this maintenance or not, or the Friedrichshafen just aren't picking up, okay? So, he keeps getting distracted. And then, just at the wrong moment.

38:44

He gets quite heads down in that problem of trying to contact Friedrichshafen Yeah. And he misses the first part of this of this TCAS. Yeah. So the two aircraft to fly in towards each other and simultaneously. They. Both. Get TCAS RAs. Yeah. And the DHL. Calls “TCAS RA” and their controller.

39:09

Doesn't hear that because he's busy with the Friedrichshafen situation. Yeah. Next minute, he notices of his own accord that these two aircraft are going to collide or. Yeah. At least they're heading towards each other. So he instructs The Russian aircraft, to descend. And to fly level, three, five zero, due crossing traffic and expedite.

39:32

He doesn't say emergency or avoiding action or anything like that. Up to the Russian stars to descend. And, This is now whilst the DHL is starting their. Manoeuvre to descend send. So just to clarify that say the Russian aircraft, They were instructed to climb on TCAS. Was that right?

39:57

And they were contradicting that by following the air traffic controllers, instruction to descend it all happen at the same time and while. Basically control is distracted. These two aircraft. Get a TCAS RA. Yeah. And the DHL aircraft is told to descend. Yeah. And the Russian aircraft is told to climb.

40:16

By the TCAS system, yeah. The. Air traffic controller wheels. This chair over sees that something's going on, has missed the fact that DHLs called over the radio TCASRA And to resolve the situation. He decides to tell the Russian to descend, fly level three five zero. I mean it's 50 50, isn't it?

40:34

I think so complete 50/50. So the Russian decide even a 25/75. Because if you'd have contacted DHL, yeah, with a conflicting instruction they might have ignored him. So DHL down game involved, because They can hear the air traffic controller, trying to deconflict is what we think happened. Initially. This.

40:57

What? I'm just describing now and folds over seconds. Yeah yeah. And now, An aural alert goes off for the controlling now which he never heard, which is totally useless anyway, because it's too too late for him to really do the for the controller to provide any Useful instructions that would result in a thousand feet of separation So it's going to be a loss of separation.

41:18

Say both aircraft to descend in. And the TCAS can see that they're still on a collision course. And so it tells the DHL. To increase the rate of descent. Hm, which they do down to 2600 feet per minute. And it now tells the Russians. To increase their climb. Even they they're not climbing, they're descending.

41:43

Now, the Russians. And CVR shows that they're a little bit confused about what to do. Yeah. Yeah. There was Can I say that there is a conversation about? It is a concept imagine you've got conflict of like you got a captain Chief pilot who's the training, captain examining, kind of examining this guy Two other pilots, well, Pilot and fly engineer all in flight deck.

42:09

This is happening pretty quickly. Interestingly the co pilot this 757 was PF. He went to the toilet . And literally, as he sat back down, And the RA was beginning, right? Now. What's amazing is these aircraft are not just at the same level. Then now descending. Yeah. But, They could be descendent at any rate.

42:34

I find it. Unbelievable. They managed to collide, like, I mean, So, I could DHL chimes in and says, Something about TCAS RA, I think they say unable to guess already. But then, in the next few seconds, the controlling gives visual. Information. To the Russians. Hmm. And says that. The DHL aircraft?

43:01

Is i think one o'clock or two o'clock? On their right side, and it's wrong. Yeah, they're on the other side, decide. Yeah. But the Russians actually spotted in the end. And that's when they start to start a climb. But it's too late, basically. So the entire vertical, stabiliser of the 757, Basically goes right through the middle.

43:25

Yeah, of this Russian aircraft, with these children on board in the middle of the night. So, the Russian aircraft is sliced into like four bits, And the 757 has no fin goes on a little bit. And just getting into a spin, just goes nose. First into the ground, 70 degrees nose down.

43:49

So, Before I talk about the aftermath, you know what, what could we unpack about that? And I mean, for me, it's I like to talk about the Swiss cheese, but there is so many little things in that, they're just remove one of them. And it probably doesn't happen. Remove that airbus going into Friedrichshafen and remove the maintenance guys in the air traffic control centre.

44:11

Removed. The The guy who's sleeping the night, he sleeping removed, the Russians, sort of following ATC rather than TCAS. I just anything. Just one little thing would probably so the Russia. So it's easy to blame the Russians, right? Yeah, I don't think you can really, I mean, but the stay had they didn't really know and they weren't required by law.

44:32

Really what? What TCAS is about Now, there manuals had about three conflicting statements in them. One that said, Be ATC is basically the final say, but another, that kind of said, you would always follow TCAS. But then another that said, you should look and try and see an avoid aircraft rather than that's your last line of defence.

44:55

So it was not objective and a must that you absolutely follow TCAS, which I think answers when you questions from earlier. So, In terms of air law, you just got a total. Fuck up there. Where The Russians are. Allowed to do whatever they want in their own airspace and then they're obviously transit in other airspace And it's not been mandated or, it's not absolutely clear what the procedure has to be.

45:21

Yeah. Another nuance now in TCAS 7.1, they changed the reversal logic. And or they updated the reversal logic so you can get reversal in TCAS but it used to be that if you if you got too close, the TCAS thought that the it's too late to command a reversal but now it will up to a later.

45:42

Point realise. Oh if one's not following out, I'll switch it around. Um because the DHL could have gone into anything of climb. Yeah, it's just bizarre that, you know, you can understand slightly two aircraft hidden each other both flying level. Because with the aeroplane flights. So accurately, but the fact that they were both in a descent, I mean, I I can't even compare, I it must it would be like two goalkeepers at different end of a football pitch, both kicking the ball, and it'd be like the balls hitting each other.

46:11

You know, be the amount of air and space up there is just so vast. Yeah. I mean, chance of two aircraft in each other. In, whilst in a manoeuvre, is some art doubtitude. It's just It's just incredibly bad. Look really. Yeah, it's horrifying. What will come on to? Another usually sleep over.

46:31

I also find A harrowing about it is that there are other aircraft that were flying around. Is a clear night that say they saw oh yeah saw the flame. You know saw the explosion basically. Yeah I mean that would just it's in July oh just stay with you forever.

46:47

Like seeing that you know it's like flying on a clear night excee hundreds of miles To see that. And and oh, yeah, horrible horrible. It just impossible to engineer this situation. Going back to the history of TCAS and mid air collisions and so on, it's it is amazing that they happen at all because I've said before, we're so used to live in on a 2D in a 2D world.

47:12

It's kind of hard to imagine how much volume there is up there. Yeah. So there is a lot of space, but Aircraft tend to congregate together, you know, in the same circuit pattern in the same, airfield the same time. Up and they're kind of attracted to each other. Yeah, you know, these, these all these layers that prevent aircraft here in each other.

47:33

And have to be there because otherwise we would all be at the same place at the same time and and that that piece of airspace there, you believe in it is a very busy bit of airspace. And although it was 11 o'clock at night in July For the to be one controller on.

47:49

I don't know too much about air traffic control but That that does strike me as as As not, right? I'm always going over that bit of airspace high altitude. Yeah. So there has to be all these things, you know, just the semicircular rule about what altitude you fly. Yeah.

48:08

And you read backs. Your the radar. Then you've got your STCA short-term collision, avoid the system, you TCAS, and so many layers that in there. That should prevent this from happening. And then, just the fact that they happen to Be so close to each other. I mean the tail of their 757.

48:28

I mean you talking like Couple of meters and it would have been a near miss or something. So, That kind of tragedy. I think difficult for humans to kind of understand. You know, in terms of our aircraft safety. Accident reports of what we go on to decide. Like, you know what what's happening.

48:50

So the next thing report didn't come out until 2004 and that's where we start to draw conclusions from and In the beginning, the air traffic control. Company responsible for air traffic, control that did. Basically blame the Russians which didn't help. What happens next? As there. Final extra reports coming out is kind of unbelievable.

49:12

But without getting too graphic, let me just Tell you what happened in the days, following the accident. Imagine you've sent your children off on an aircraft. He told that there's been no survivors and you know, quite common. I think a lot of these parents didn't believe it. The Russians flew them out there like the next day or something.

49:31

And they get to the site and this beautiful countryside. And of the site of this, this crash. If you split a spread over quite a wide distance, the the tupolev aircraft And the Russian is just join in like the the search effort. One gentleman. Vitaly. Kelly of. Goes to find his wife, his daughter, and his son.

49:58

And straight away, just Thus starts looking for for them. And he finds his daughter. In the woods. Wearingthe little necklace that she wears is young tiny little daughter and later on Basically finds his wife and his son as well. So, For a human being to be able to comprehend.

50:18

Really, what has unfolded to fly to this? This piece of countryside, like far away and, and your families lying there. You know, in the, in the days after it's just, it's incomprehensible, yeah. So the edge trafficking controller is obviously Most weird. He needs mentor treatment basically for being The edge of controller, he was responsible, at that time, the one on duty.

50:47

And, The parents had turning up to the side of the crash. And, You know, totally destroyer and there's probably a lot of anger. And the father of, if those of that family vitali Kelly of wants to me with the air traffic controller and obviously that that doesn't happen and and refuses.

51:10

And then over the next few years, you know, bits of the Accident report, start to unfold and so on. Just a few months before the final extra report. Years later. Vitali of decided to return. To that same place. And hires a private detective. To find the air traffic controller.

51:32

And decides to go and confront him. Turns up to his house. Where he himself has got three children. I think the air traffic, controller. Neilson is his surname. Confronts him in his back garden. And stabs him to death in front of his own family, then he dies within minutes. In Front of his children.

51:54

Say I said, like really terrible. turn of events, it's not really related to the aviation necessarily. But then the story gets even crazier. Because, He's arrested and he goes to prison. But he only he does like a couple of years. Putin lobbies to get him out. Yeah. And he's Has this sentence reduced for diminished responsibility.

52:21

And then he gets lobbyed gets out, then he goes back to Russia. And becomes like quite a high ranking politician. Yeah, there is area and then gets like a national award like one of the highest awards for his region for his services in politics. And, This is all sort of explains why you can see him be an interviewed on multiple locations in high definition.

52:46

Talking with complete victory, all about that controller like talking. And with no regret, remorse whatsoever about the murder that he committed. Which is something I don't think I've ever seen in my life but before which is like, he's not locked away where you can't hit. He's shouting from the rooftops about how proudy as of what he did and seemingly as the support of the people who are You know in his country here appointing him on TV and so on and say the Russian is like have quite a different response, Nationally to the accident and and his involvement in it.

53:24

I don't really know what to say, like it's crazy, it's a crazy story and I think. Good that, you know, let's say this last bit is not really related to TCAS but Is such a dramatic story. I think admit actually being Possibly the most dramatical. Yeah, exactly. Aircraft accident.

53:44

I don't know. Most harrowing , aircraft accident. It then invokes like so much emotion. Yeah, in the people who Survive effectively. But they didn't know how to respond. Either nationally, or on an individual level because there is no explanation, your average aircraft accident, like to me, like a road traffic accident, you know what I'm like about speeding.

54:08

A road traffic accident, you know, with with fatalities. It's just so meaningless. It's like it's not cancer, it's not, it didn't have to happen. Yeah. An air traffic. Accidents are always the same. They're just I think if you lost somebody in one, you would never really understand why on a human level like why is that happened?

54:30

But this one, with all the, the my new Things that came together to allow it to happen. Is even more unexplainable. Does that make sense? Definitely. And so more. Upset in shocking. Yeah, shocking. Yeah. It's a shocking story. So for me, all it does. Really maybe as I've got older is In.

54:56

You know, sad. Sadly, it posts like the human element back into the job. But then, It also shows you that How amazing? We can do. Some some geeks who've probably never flown a plane in their life, like, came up with the algorithm, like in the 60s to detect aircraft, collisions and fit omni directional, aerials to top and bottom of aircraft then And then some genius, you know who knew about the semantics of aircraft displays was like kept flying to the green.

55:29

Yeah. How many lives have been saved like that? Despite that tragic story, TCAS has been a brilliant edition to The aircraft and saved many, many lives and accidents. So long may continue. Yeah absolutely and it's moving promptly just inside the green. Yeah and keep it really simple for those pilots for risk, guys For me.

55:50

Yeah. That's it? Really? That's TCAS. All right. Yes.

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Airline Pilot Technical Theory Adam Howey Airline Pilot Technical Theory Adam Howey

Circling

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00:00

Sam Adam Circling and approaches. Yeah. When was last time you did a circling approach? a traditional circling approach. Yeah. Because they might have evolved very recently along. No. I don't a few years. Yeah. I'd say the same quite a memorable space say yeah. Couple years. Okay. I think Pisa.

00:20

Yeah. Okay. Possibly. Yeah. I've definitely done one or two Pisa. I’ve done one in Dubrovnik as well. One the most memorable approach of my career. Is technically a Circling approach to Arrecife, Lanzarote Runway 21. Okay. Is that one of those this but it's not a traditional circling as such but because it's so offset it classes as a circling area.

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What is Circling

00:47

What is a circling approach? Well, I went straight to the manual. I came up with a visual manoeuvre following an instrument approach to a, a runway that is not suitable for a straight in approach. Normally, what do we do to make an approach to an airfield as an airline though?

01:06

Yes. And normally we would follow an instrument approach procedure. Yeah. The runway essentially is a straight in. It would be lined up with the inbound QDM of the only way, but at some airfields, that's just not possible, whether it's due to terrain. Yeah. Facilities. Wind direction on the day.

01:24

Obviously, can force you into a circling approach. Normally, we're basically flying down a beam in bound to something, which for an ILS. Is the threshold? The touchdown zone. Yes. Like a perfect piece of technology, you just fly straight down there. I'll take you straight down and the perfect angle to touch down on the runway.

01:46

Yep. A non-precision approach would be flying in-bound to a VOR or an NDB, which would be pretty close to the runway, if you're lucky. Yep. So you're saying that where you can't fly inbound to some kind of radio aid because there's terrain in the way there just isn't a radio facility.

02:10

Yeah cost wise you know there's no then you fly inbound to the airfield using some kind of instrument procedure. Yeah. But then you've got to do a visual manoeuvre to align yourself with the piece of tarmac that you want to land on. Exactly. It's almost like a visual circuit in a way you all.

02:28

Because is it a visual? Well, there is not a visual circuit but the pattern would look simple. You essentially using the instrument approach to get you to almost overhead the airport and then visually manoeuvring yeah to land in the direction you want to land in and there's like a traditional pattern that you see.

02:45

Yeah. But they might it might not look like that. No. Exactly the classic idea of a circling approach is that you make an ILS to a runway but the tail winds too strong for that runway. So you break just fly down wind and you're landing completely the opposite direction, using a visual manoeuvre.

03:03

Yeah, the majority of airports have intro approaches to every runway around my area but if someone's built an airport in the some stupid place, that's the way the pilot sees like nestled around some terrain. Yep. You can't have a straighten approach because you'd be flying through the hills if you're on because what angle do we normally fly and approach in vertically.

03:26

So typically a sort of three degree but there's an upper limit. Also 400 feet per nm. I think. Okay, he'll design limit. And I've always wanted to know more about how and who designs approaches to airfields and how they do it. There is no typical circling pattern. No and well there is one but in reality yeah it's not a visual circuit because we would I think everybody basically transport aircraft flies visual circuits of 1500 feet.

03:55

Correct. And this can be a lot lower. Yeah, definitely. Yeah. I mean you could be 500 feet or less by the time you roll out on the centre line, the same level intended landing runway. So yeah, so maybe let's talk about that traditional pattern just as listeners can visualise it.

04:10

So typically fly down the instrument approach. The ILS to let's call it a thousand feet. That's probably an average circling approach. So you go down to a thousand feet, a thousand feet, you would hope to be visual with the runway because you're gonna conduct the rest of the manoeuvre visually.

04:26

So visual with the airport, the airfield a thousand feet, let's be clear about that. So if you're not visual what your option well you'd have to go around because you can't carry out the circling. Anyway it's a visual manoeuvre. So to commence ther circling procedure to break off your instrument procedure.

04:43

You have to be visual. Yep. And there's obviously a couple of ways of define and what that means. Yeah and but you break clouds your visual, you would then turn to offset by 45 degrees. So thinking about which way you're circling, it might be prescribed on the chart as to circling to the south or to the west.

05:02

So you turn 45 degrees either left or right off the instrument approach track and then you generally time that for 30 seconds typically which would then put you out a sort of mile and a half maybe away from the runway and then you turn downwind to parallel the runway.

05:20

So like like you were in the visual circuit almost but a bit lower, a thousand feet and then when you get abeam, the threshold that you're gonna land on, I need the opposite end to the instrument approach. You start a sequence of timing and descend and configuration, which would bring you out in, almost like a continuous base and final turn onto the runway.

05:42

That's essentially what I'm trying to allow the listeners to visualise. What? Yeah, if you're not if you look at it from above the track, it would look like the let like a letter D. I suppose roughly? Yeah. Okay. Here I suppose. Yeah. a P if you circling left hand.

05:59

But yeah, it would look not far for general aviation circuit diagram. Yeah, downwind. And you have the like, but due to the altitude. You're lightly to fly a continuous turn from downwind during the basis. Finally. It's not gonna be like a long base leg because you're just not that wide. No.

06:17

So it is probably as complicated as as it sounds and there's a lot going on. What's the workload like workloads high and as we'll talk about later, one of the reasons quite often the workload is high is because people aren't expecting it. It's maybe been thrown at them last minute and they potentially weren't planning to do a circling.

06:40

They thought it was going to be the instrument approach to land on that runway all of a sudden the wind is shifted and it's now tailwind on that runway so out of limit. So you have to land from a circuit off the instrument approach and usually you're quite close to the airport at this stage.

06:54

So limited time to brief it which means the workload gets high. Even if briefed at the workload is still high, it's tracks. It's timings it's distances, it's configuration, you're close to the ground. It's not something we do very often. It's 12 years of flying. I reckon I've probably done five or six really one every couple of years.

07:11

Maybe if that and I've gone around from one out of my five. Where was that? That was into dubrovnik. That's why I remember. It's a well. So I only telling me so purely our own fault as to why we went around, I remember distinctly saying, you went around you hadn't.

07:26

Hadnt had your command that long? I don't think I and so. Okay, executed, you missed approach, fine, nothing wrong with what you did, really good decision. But now it's like, well, what did go wrong? Yeah, and if I repeat, what I just did, I might not just gonna end up executing another missed approach.

07:43

Yeah, because we went around because we were high. We turned on to final and we had four white lights on the, that one, the papi, definitely one of the fears when I think about circular approach, is like, I can execute the manoeuvre as per the manual. I can brief it.

07:55

I can overcome loads of the threats to this element of when I roll wings level on final or I get that first, look at the threshold on the base. Turn what if too low too high you know? Yeah. Why is that happen? This there's an element of approximation.

08:14

You haven't got many chances to get it right? No. You're moving to the area, you know. But just under 150 mile, an hour, just rewind it a bit then. So precision approach has got a vertical element to it. Yeah, a number is an approach doesn't have vertical guidance. Yeah, it's nice and fluffy to fly an ILS.

08:33

What? Firstly, it's what we do all the time? Yeah, I'd say 95 out of 100 approaches are probably an ILS but it's there. It's inherently like easy to fly. Yeah. It's sort of almost it says fly left fly right? Flyer fly down, the autopilot . It loves it. So, did you know that on a circling approach?

08:53

You're 25 times more likely to have an accident on a circling approach than a non-precision approach, and you're another eight times more likely than a precision approach. So, 32 times more so that makes sense. Yeah. Alright. Oh yeah, so when you look at the safety margins in terms of the statistics of accidents control, flying, terrain being probably the main one.

09:16

The ILS, is the safest non-precision approach. Is you're more like you have an accident but on a circling approach, you're highly more likely to have an accident. Yeah. Something that we're not used to high workload. A lot of few variables. Yeah, I was gonna say is a new one.

09:33

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Why Bother

This is like ambiguity to like, yeah, it's anything. Yeah, that contributes to this fact that you're more likely to have an accident on one of them, why would you ever do one then? Why bother. Yeah, I mean it well it might be the only way to get into an airport so the say, the tail winds on the instrument approach might be out outside of the aircraft limits.

09:55

You can't land on that runway because the tailwind, yeah, or subsequently, you're landing distance is not sufficient to land. So the only way to land at the airport is on the reciprocal runway, which maybe doesn't have an arm of approach, doesn't have an ILS, doesn't have a VOR approach.

10:10

It's literally it's got nothing. So the only option you've got is to circle to land from the other. And yeah, I guess there guys who guys, you know, and girls who design procedures they're going to give you every option to get into the area that they can. But I think it's worth those discussing just because it's technically within limits and it's technically doing.

10:32

Okay. Do you have to execute one but like you're saying the option is there for you, you might need to get on the ground. Yeah, and it might be the only you don't do anything outside of the SOPs. Although I do think some airlines have basically told the crews they're not to do certain approaches basically saying you can only do a circling approach if it's the only option available to you.

10:57

Yeah. Yeah. Any element of like instrument procedure guidance makes the approach safer. It's yeah. And that makes sense. And circling is is way sort of left up to your own? No you don't. You don't have any beams to fly down basically. Yeah. It's a bit of guesswork. Yeah. Of kind of tracks and distances timings.

11:18

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Circling vs Visual Approach

So tell me what's the difference and I really want to bring this up as a point. What's the difference between circular approach and a visual approach official approach is? Essentially, there are no minima. You are flying visually with reference, so reference to the ground. There's no sort of prescription as to where you'll be a certain point.

11:38

Whereas, a circling approach you actually are flying an instrument approach to get there. You have a minimum , there's a minimum associated with it. Yeah. And then you are following a prescribed sort of prescribed procedure from that. Minimum point is that I think to, to mitigate the threats associated with a circling approach.

11:59

Unlike other approaches, we fly, you need a higher level of knowledge and procedures where your knowledge and procedures about what you're doing. Yeah, about the design of it is more important than other approaches. People know that if you go out, whatever the limits are on your ILS or if you know you VOR, then you then you call a go-around.

12:21

But you don't necessarily understand the design of the procedure your flying , you need that increased knowledge of exactly what you're doing. Yeah, and one of the nuances or I think it's a trap is the association it has with a visual approach and the flight safety foundation did identify when they were looking into circling approaches and they've got a whole paper on issues identified, which you can find online.

12:51

One of their risks is that the ambiguity between the two. I think, if you understand the difference between the two, then you gain a long way to understand, what are circling approach really is. Yeah, so, just extremely back to basics when we fly airline aircraft. We're basically flying under instrument, flight rules, the whole time.

13:09

Yeah, regardless of what the weather's like. Yeah. And so, we need instrument, approaches to make approaches and even low visibility to approaches. I mean that we can basically take off and landing, pretty much any weather, and the design of the airspace, the instrument, approaches the departures, they're all designed to keep us clear of terrain.

13:30

Yeah. And traffic. Yeah, and now it's like a statement of the obvious but basically it's like we could fly with no windows in the flight deck. Yeah. Yeah. But when we do a circling an approach, it's a visual flight manoeuvre. Yeah, so we have to balance and the use of the instruments and the radio beacons that we might be using to get where we're going with.

13:53

Also just looking out the window. When we're doing a visual approach or there, we might choose to draw on some of the technology in the flight deck. The only thing stopping us from hitting the terrain is our decisions with regard to our flight path based on us. Looking at the window.

14:11

Yeah. Okay. Does that make sense? That makes sense. The reason you don't hit the hill on a visual approach is because you don't fly into the hill. It's same as a PPL flying VMC. How does he not hit the terrain? Well, he just can see the terrain . He doesn't hit the terrain, doesn't give you the aircraft on a circling approach.

14:27

You're using visual information, you're taking that into your brain through your eyeball, you ever have trainers, always say to them. The mark one eyeball and I never there, I was always like, I hate that phrase. They mean, like it's the first. Yeah. Or they're the first and the best design of the instrument that you have.

14:46

Okay. Fine. Yeah. Yeah. Use your mark one eyeball. Right. So you're using your eyeball and that together with other information navigation, information that you're taking in combined to make the circling approach, but there's a design criteria to the approach, which keeps you safe. Yes, we exceed the rules of this circling approach.

15:06

Then you could have controlled flight into terrain. So what sort of rules you talking about there then? What? Okay, so circling approach has an area. Like someone's got a, protractor from school. Yeah, they've stuck the needle part of the protractor into the threshold of the runway. Yeah. And they've drawn a circle around two ends of the runway, a little safe area.

15:29

Yeah, safe area and a lot of airports, you'll say, don't circle to the northwest or something. So it's not always safe all the way around the room way, but depending on the speed that you fly outside, aircraft is up to 180 knots cat D. Slightly higher. Then they've said this area is safe.

15:46

So was it 4.2 nautical miles for a cat? D? Aircraft around the threshold? Yeah, and then there's different like US is different. Well, let's come on to TERPS in a second, which is ridiculous. Right. But basically you have this kind of safe area and that in itself is a trap because I think a lot of pilots understand.

16:05

Okay. So there's a couple of miles which I'm safe. If I go outside of that, I'm not in the protected area but it's not just that, right? So there's a circular minima and they're different, right? Yeah. What they guarantee? On all instrument approaches include in a circling approach, okay, which is totally different from a visual approach is the obstacle clearance height.

16:26

Yeah, and it's only 394 feet when you circling in ICAO pans ops. Yeah, you might be downwind and you might be a thousand feet above the aerodrome level, but 394 feet below you. There could be a hill. Now, that's like really important to understand if you ask me because you've got to depart from your circular minima at some point and start to make your approach from the circular minimum down to the threshold of, the runway.

16:52

Yeah, now, all of this is in about 2.4 kilometres visibility. Yeah. So even though your visual, it doesn't have to to the visibility. So how many miles is that 2.4? Km is like a mile and a half and say, what your average decent size airport might have a two mile runway.

17:11

Like you see, might not even be able to see the whole runway . Yeah. Says, if you need to understand the visual requirements explicitly, right? And then you need to understand that this could be really, really challenging visual task for you to carry out to fly the aircraft and maintain this visual part of the many other.

17:31

Yep. So you could be just 394 feet above a hill, You could barely make out the airfield environment. So, that's, that's really tough now. Yeah, you have to stick to the design criteria and the rules and the SOPs associated with the circling approach is totally different to a visual approach.

17:49

A reason that I'm trying, I have a bit of a go about the two differences. Is that if you've got the two concepts mixed up in your head, at any point, you could find yourself, kind of, doing half of one and half. Yeah, yeah. And then you could have some control flight into terrain CFIT.

18:05

Yeah. Because your visual requirements, depending on the speed of the aircraft should be more. Akin to what you're used to as a VFR pilot. Which is that you have a vertical separation from cloud above you of like 1500ft or a thousand feet. Sorry. And that you have some kind of horizontal distance between you and cloud because you're travelling at speed and you don't know when cloud bases are going to creep down towards you.

18:30

And you don't know, you know, if you might turn left in a minute and you might fly over there, you fly here. So you need a big bubble of VFR space around you, right? So a visual approach you should have VMC criteria, right? So you can make those judgements about not hitting terrain okay on a circling approach.

18:50

If you just break cloud at the minima, the tail of your aircraft might be in cloud still. Yeah. And that's perfectly acceptable. That's allowable. Yeah, so there's there's a difference between visual approach and a circling approach and to me they're massive and they should not be mixed up. Yeah, whatsoever.

19:11

And I think some of these accidents that we might talk about. I just think in the back of their minds, they kind of remember their airfield from them a visual day and what they got away with on that day. Yeah, sure. Yeah. So you described some of the secrets of events that you would how you would position yourself and that's where I want to talk about the workload, which may even be kind of unique to the phase of flight, which is where using visual elements.

19:41

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Workload and Task Sharing

But you're also quite inside the flight as well and between the two of you. So you've got a lot of task sharing to manage. Yeah. So why don't you like pick up on some of that? Okay yet? So gonna have somebody flying the aircraft. Somebody pilot flying pilot not flying.

19:57

And the decision is to who's gonna land or who's gonna be the pilot flying for the landing could depend on which way you're circling. So that pilot on the inside, it's gonna have a much better view potentially of the runway and certainly around like a base turn. And my experience is that if you're not on the inside you don't see anything.

20:18

You wouldn't see anything. Yeah. Yeah. If you're on the outside of the approach, you'd really struggle so that that has to come into it. There's obviously monitoring of tracks distances timings configuration, there's a lot going on. It's really really big. It is quite busy and it's happening fast. You're you know, 180 knots.

20:35

You could only we probably that's the limit. But you potent manoeuvre, 394 feet above obstacles at 200 mile an hour. You can have tailwind probably but on the certainly on the yeah. So if you're on like it is, if it's three point, whatever miles for a cat C protected area, I mean you're gonna go from one side to the other.

20:55

Yeah. Very very quickly in. Not a lot of time. Yeah. You could have ground speeds of 220 to 30 knots which is 250 mile an hour. Yeah, pretty pretty fast. To be going above, you know, 390 feet above. Yeah, so yeah. It's it's a visual flight manoeuvre . Possibly in the worst weather, you can think of it.

21:14

So these are a few, the problems other ones that potentially catch people out is missed approach. So let's say you do lose visual contact with the runway at some point you're scudding along just beneath the cloud as you mentioned and for whatever reason you do lose visual contact with the runway you therefore have to or should execute a missed approach.

21:34

Well what sort of missed approach. Do you do you know you flew down the instrument approach to you're in a base turned and back towards the runway you've lost visual don't really want to fly back up the instrument approach. There might be the aircraft coming down it. So we are supposed to fly the missed approach from the instrument approach.

21:54

I the ILS that might be 180 degree turning face to face to. You wouldn't potentially do that or you might know you would know. That's but but people may negotiate. It's possible to negotiate with their traffic right to do something different because it might be counterintuitive to make a complete 180 degree turn.

22:13

But what I'm saying is it's just another layer of okay? Things to think about another element going back to what you said there. I mean the time to be working that out. Exactly. Yeah. I could have turned base. Exactly yeah. Yeah. Because by the time you've got the chart out and got a word in on the radio.

22:31

You could have hit the hills. Yeah. And let's pick up on something that I was saying again because I don't want I think this is a chance. Remove ambiguity. I mean, back in the days when JAR OPS came into the UK, so they started to harmonise the procedures across Europe before.

22:52

EASA, the manuals were full of should and could words and they went through them and just any sentence that said, that removed it. So you said if the cloud base is coming down a bit, you should go around. No, you must go-around, just 390 feet below.

23:07

You could be a hill. Yeah, you're gonna be extremely tempted to just, okay. Just just lower the nose as well. You should have the automatics in but just, you know, or hold on a few more seconds. This is just a puff of cloud, they were gonna get through, I don't want to throw away the whole approach just for that.

23:24

Yeah, so there's a massive trap there and the psychological effects there on you really powerful. You can visually see the runway. Yeah, I can see the runway and I can see the terrain below me. So why should I care about going through this little whisp of cloud? Yeah, is going to the brain is going to be screaming that you like don’t go around.

23:44

Yeah. Are you going to creep lower and lower and lower? So that's a real danger. Yeah. The other thing there is about the missed approach. So if there is any ambiguity in the flight deck, we always want to like take that out. Yeah. So hopefully back in the cruise while you were briefing.

23:58

All this. You could have discussed it with the FO. What would we do for the missed approach. Yep. And if there's something you're not sure about tell ATC beforehand. If we do a missed approach our plan is the next one said. Yeah, sure. So the guy on the inside is keeping his eye on the runway.

24:15

Now that's interesting because where do we normally look, we do normally look. There's the threshold. There's no way when I'm gonna start my timer but you need to also be projecting the flight path in front of you. Yeah I'm not gonna fly through cloud. Yeah you kind of make a safe descent towards the runway clear of cloud and terrain.

24:37

Yeah, definitely. And I don't think that's gonna motor skill that I have. Like always looking at. That's the threshold. That's yeah, you need to look ahead. I'm gonna fly over there and there's a bit of a hill there. And yeah, that's one that's another thing to consider. So somebody's busy doing that and the coordination between the two of you has to work kind of like clockwork.

24:54

Yeah. And you know I was wondering about training because it doesn't work very well in the sim in my opinion. No, the lots of trainers. Think about a certain approach in the sim. Yeah, it's not ideal because generally because the visual graphics in the sim, don't allow you that sort of range of view that you would normally get in the aircraft.

25:11

If you'd normally get a better, yeah, likewise, depending on the quality of the graphics in the yeah. Same, you know, it might not be quite as realistic or visuals. Yeah. Might not be quite as realistic as in the aircraft. So what about night in in real life more about night circling?

25:27

When you think of that? Yeah, I mean, we're allowed to do that. In fact, that works better in the sim, because you can pick out the lights on the wrong. Way easier. Some airlines on a totally say yeah. There's no night. Actually a night cycling. Yeah. So the pans ops design criteria for circling 2.4 kilometres.

25:46

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Challenging Weather

Yes, the minimum visibility to commence a circling approach, but any airline I've seen has five kilometres as a minimum. Yeah. But can I just say honestly, as a, as a captain, right now, if I was looking at an airfield with circling in 5k, I might rather be in the bar at the diversion app.

26:06

Yeah, honestly, this is what I was getting too earlier. It's like, you don't have to necessarily do the approach. No, I think circling even in, don't forget to and a half k. I, I think that's is 5k. Is it? What 5k is, is, did you say goldfish bowl earlier?

26:23

That's a trainers like phrase. I didn't know, I thought you said that, but I mean 5k is when you last make an approach in 5k like don't do very often and so, so adding to all of these layers of workload and stuff. You know, we're not doing certain approaches at Heathrow or Gatwick or just, you know, where it's flat, right?

26:42

You doing a circular approach at places like Pisa the Dubrovnik Genoa where there's terrain all around you. So many different hazards. The last thing you want to be doing, is up in your workload, by doing it in poor weather. So, you know, you could be in the bar and that's a bit of a might not be everyone's ideal, but I'm just saying you this painting a picture.

27:01

You could be in the bar at the destination. Yeah. Okay. So you could be circling in 5k. It's not just that. Yeah, diverted. Yeah, it's one of those things that you can never say what's the right answer until you're actually there on the day. And it's that balance between the safety and the commercial, Your passenger down the back is going to be pretty annoyed.

27:22

Seeing you in the bar, the diversion when they want to be on their holiday, do, I mean? And they weren't under something that he weighs on you and your decision making no, but they wouldn't understand like why couldn't we do the circling approach? You know, you're a profession you know, you paid a lot of money like and you're allowed to do it.

27:39

Why isn't something it's coming? Some of these accidents will look at is that in my opinion, although we've lectured you and I have both lectured meteorology, I still. Yeah, don't have like the best grasp. You know, the my the micro meteorological phenomena everywhere but it does seem to me that around terrain.

27:58

Yeah, the cloud like clings to it. Yeah, yeah. That's like a five-year-old explaining it but so often you're circling around the edge of this terrain. Yeah, that's right. Where these and I think some of these accidents that we'll look at have that feature. Yeah. Now, Arrecife 21 and I've had so many the different stories and in personal experiences about Arrecife.

28:20

But once upon a time, I did a diversion due to lack of visual reference during the circling approach there. So, went a Furerteventura , it’s the Canaries to in it's beautiful, right? And I get the cabin, crew watch in the flight deck, looks left, look right out the windows and when, oh, we've diverted have we?

28:40

And I was like, yeah, yes, it's not good. And I didn't pick up on it but she's being sarcastic, right? Yeah. Weather's bad, is it? And I was like, yeah, yeah. She went, oh, she looks out the window as if we just done it because today we get paid more if we divert or yeah.

28:56

Yeah. So yeah people don't understand. No and also I don't if you look out the window, the fuselage you might think I can see really far, but you might not be able to see the effort. Just it's totally different picture. Yeah, but my point is that there's no shame.

29:14

No, of course, not in say that. Basically, you know, it was taught to me, these sort of what is a red flag, you know. It could be all sorts of things, you know, the hairs on the back of your neck. Literally, you know, just when these things start adding up, I remember my last diversion was trying to get into Naples and it was just covered in thunderstorms, we couldn't even find a place to hold.

29:37

That wasn't like in a CB. Yeah, so we were like waiting for a bit before we maybe made an approach. Okay? Was and we started to take some vectors nothing? Okay, we're not gonna do that. I'm gonna tell the effort, like, what is he, you know, I'm gonna start questioning the FO.

29:53

Maybe maybe start a diversion but then the best red flag was the ATC came on and went. Hey, yeah, such and such and it was an airline that I don't respect very much. They just got in and I was like, okay, we're diverting. Yeah. You know, that was the red flag for me?

30:13

It was like, yeah, because often on these approaches, somebody gets in just before the crash. Yeah, yeah. Say the weather can't be that bad, but when I heard, oh, it's such and such an airline, I was like, yeah, yeah. That's if it went ahead of and, you know, Qantas just got in.

30:29

I'd be like, oh, okay, maybe it's terrible. But the pressure to, like, to accept these approaches and one thing when you find yourself, yeah, when you find yourself down there, they're in the basin. There were imagining in this terrain in this. Soup of low visibility mean doing, right?

30:47

You can do certainly approaches on CAVOK days as well. There are situations where the visibilities are not very good. You've got all the visual illusions, this tomato graphic illusion, the yeah, yeah, how close does train look in, love is all sorts of things happening to you. You should always have a plan B, right?

31:06

As an aviator, which normally is of go around, basically, you need to think it through maybe brief it, but that's the point, isn't it? You find yourself on one of these circling approaches and you might not have a plan B, if you've really screwed up because you like, how do I even get out here?

31:19

Which way, do I fly? How do I disorientation? You know, like the air traffic control everything. So, what you picking up on there? Yeah, the mr. Approach, hopefully would have been brief back in the cruise and maybe co-ordinate that with ATC, but the temptation not to go around because I go around, should be really easy, and straightforward.

31:38

But if any go around is gonna be hard, it's gonna be drawing a circling approach. It's gonna make you think I don't want to do this and you said that circling approaches your 25 25 times more likely to have than a non-precision non-precision approach, I kind of thought. Wow, that's because I didn't know that figure, but now that we've just spent 40 minutes talking about all the reasons why they're not dangerous, but why they we've not really gone.

32:02

See if anybody's listening, perhaps doesn't fly an airline aircraft. Like not even really talked about the nuances of like. Yeah, the timings you said, you set in an old-fashioned stopwatch to determine when to turn. How much bank do you based on wind and tailwind what she rated descend. Yeah, and then remember how do you judge that?

32:24

You've got any of this right? Yeah eyeball. Yeah. You line up on the runway does it look right? Am I around you? Yeah. And then you fly through a whisp of cloud and you're like oh come on. Like yeah, I can carry on now. Yeah, so certainly approaches are the least favourable for flight safety for pilots for air traffic control?

32:45

I imagine probably not that fun to them. Yeah because they want departure straight up the lane that you lovely just like on down front. Yeah, so no idea a busy airport but their designs say that there's an option to get you in terps, which I don't think is a direct initialism like t e r p.

33:03

S is the American for terminal approach. Yes. So their design criteria is even more insane. So, the the protected area, which is like an old-fashioned name for white spirit. That's what? Yeah, that's what I own there. Old men call like white spirits, got better. Yeah, but yeah, I think Americans think of it as a circling, how they design their circling procedures.

33:25

They're even more restrictive there. So if you don't have an understanding of the the diameter of the protected area, the rules say just reiterate it's not like a big safe play area. Yeah you got to get it right we in there see when you leave your minima to head towards the threshold to send was a threshold that's got to be done at the right point.

33:49

Say and with all these things that we've highlighted as the way you can go wrong. Fortunately there are quite a few so of accidents incidents that have come off circling approaches. Yeah, well they know you and I looked at the same one. There's plenty to look at out there.

34:06

They do all seem to have the same sort of theme though in that generally workload. Whether miscommunication they all have a sort of similar say a similar theme like a mismanage workflow. Yeah. Overloads a crash happens in bad weather. Okay, unfamiliarity, poor communication. Yeah. So, and which one was we talk about the China?

34:30

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Air China 129

Air China 129, Say, as always, this or caveat, we talk about accidents is not nice to talk about but it's always about improving, flight safety and learning from them. And, as with all accidents, there's never just one course, there's always the Swiss cheese, there's always numerous contributors.

34:48

So air China 129 was 2002. It was a Boeing, 767 attempting to land in Busan, South Korea. And I've literally written my notes here Swiss cheese, because there was a lot of there was a lot of holes throughout so it was poor weather. It was right on. In fact, it was below the circling minima that they should have been flying to this the one way, very when even sure what their own category.

35:16

Yeah, yeah. See. So this is the Swiss cheese as the first bit of Swiss cheese, so 767 the 767 manual. Apparently in a, you know, about me, you've learnt seven, six, you can be CAT C or CAT D depending on landing weight With the same, as the 321. Yeah, on this day, with their landing weight, they were CATC.

35:37

However, the 767 manual on the next line says for circling approach is it is to be considered as a cat D, because unfortunately, perhaps here, something shouldn't be mixed up, but it is you're landing fees. Usually based on your category of aircraft. Yeah, the airline wants you to be a lesser lesser category.

35:56

Usually between C and D obviously. So some of these aircraft are between the two but obviously, the manufacturers like for safety. Yeah, you're a cat D. Yeah. So they were asked a couple of times by the controllers to what category they were. They thought they were a cat sea aircraft.

36:12

And so, they were flights the CAT C, see minima, which was just below the cloud base. But actually, if they've been flying to the correct minima, which is the cat d minim, they would never have got visual at minimums. There was right? The minimum was the cloud basis actually below there.

36:26

So there's the first, you know, conf is the first hole in the Swiss cheese and protected area is less as well, this was a TERPS. This was terps something to do with the US military in South Korea. Probably yeah, I guess so. So that was one factor so whether not sure what minimum they were flying to.

36:50

But the classic, the absolute classic that we've talked about the late change of runway. So they were expecting runway 36 which was an instrument approach. They were expecting that all the way in and it was the last minute change to runway. 18, circling approach is said in the report, they had very little time to prepare and that that's classic if you haven't briefed ahead rushing another, what approach briefing?

37:14

That requires quite a bit thought, genuine question, then, oh, are there any options they could have had like having that high workload, sprung on them. Apart from, in hindsight, they could have briefed so you definitely could have briefed a certain approach. I don't know what their fuel state was but they could have taken holding pattern, perhaps, right in a couple laps of the hold just to just do the brick, complete the briefing because they were all them familiar.

37:38

I think I don't think any of them ever circled this airport before, right? But in my mind, if you're going to an airport and you're like well there's no less on that and what's on the other end and it's circling surely that's an alarm out of light. Oh yeah.

37:52

Well yeah. If yet possibly yet, definitely it certainly would be something I would consider I'd like to think I would consider but you know I I have had times where it might not been a circling. It might be something else. It was slightly more tricky but I haven't briefed it because I thought there's no chance and then all of a sudden it does get sprung, but it definitely happens all the time.

38:15

This happened. So workload was high and the classic sign that workloads high was in some of the radio calls I found, they were the approaching controller was handing them over to the tower frequency. But they didn't have the capacity to check in with the tower and then they missed a couple of calls and that's a classic sign of overload.

38:33

Their hearing had gone, they're kind of tunnelled into their brains prioritising. This prioritising what it wants to probably. Yeah, exactly themselves. Prior to kind of classic sign that they were, they were overloaded. And what else did you find interesting about it that regardless of whether their category cat?

38:51

See, they flew quite fast. Yes, they were to TERPS. They were supposed to be a 140 kts for a cat. C, and they, the flight data recorder had them between 150 and 160 knots, so kind of 20 knots fast going downwind. And then, as we said, you're highly likely to have a tail wind, which they really did have quite a tailwind.

39:13

Yeah, ground speed was really high. Yeah, they ended up downwind. They didn't turn, we would turn 45 degrees on the downwind of some reason. They didn't quite turn that much. So by the time they established on the downwind, like, they were already basically at the end. Yeah, of the runway.

39:32

Yeah, which adds to the workload? Yeah, greatly. And then one of the big contributors I read was that when the captain took control to commence the base turn and landing and he was on the outside as well. So nowhere near in the best, I'm not even sure that any of them really had the runway in sight,

39:51

You know for the whole approach I think there was times when they lost it and they gained it again but when the captain took control to make the base turn apparently it took him 40 seconds. Approximately 40 seconds to initiate that turn meaningfully through about 10. It's the point in three five zero degrees and they didn't go through north three, six zero degrees until 40 seconds after.

40:15

So you imagine it, you know, 200 and 200 knots ground speed. That's a lot of distance. Yeah, That they've covered you. Look at their diagram. They just fly straight.

40:52

Outside of the protected area in no time. Yeah. And for whatever reason, I think from the Korean accident report, they've overlaid the comms onto it. And you can see that they're not starting the turn and anywhere near inside the protected area. So then, as they're coming around the base, turn the first officer, definitely, lost sight of the runway though, they're all lost like the runway and the first officer called the missed.

41:14

Approach , but the captain didn't initiate it and about five seconds after that they they hit them out, hit the mountain. So my question to you would be if you've read this, why didn't the GPWS go off and tell them? They're about to hit mountain. That's all I kept thinking as well.

41:32

Yeah, I had to look it up so mode 2B. Yeah, I did not activate because unfortunately, the altitude that they're already at 700 feet with the speed that they were doing. Yeah meant that they didn't enter the, the envelope of the, the warning of the GPWS, or the caution, because they were fully configured for landing.

41:51

They yeah, a box out gear down. The rate of descent was sensible and their speed was sensible right until the last minute, where they had, I think 1800 feet per minute, but it still didn't have enough time to trigger. Yeah. So just to state the obvious, then obviously the GPWS stops some crashing into the ground.

42:09

But at some point, we have to land on the ground. Yeah. And we don't want it going off. Yeah. So the designers cleverly made these envelopes. Where if you slow down, and you've got the gear down and in the enhanced GPWS, they also build a basin around the runway.

42:25

Yep, that you can descend into but the basic modes are always there anyway and you're slow enough and you creep down enough then you can stop. Then there's even the G. So GPWS, why not go off? Which is really unfortunate because you would think it would go off. Yeah.

42:43

There's another trap of the circular approach, which is you fold the aircraft, into thinking that your landing. Yeah. Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. Absolutely. Other little bits I read about those system, the controllers had because it was a difficult airport with a lot of rain around the MSAW system, which I can't remember what that stands for some sort of warning system.

43:04

We're basically on the control on the air traffic, controller screens, it would flash if an aircraft was outside of the protected area and close to terrain. But is this why the controller kept asking them what their category was? So they could set it possibly. I don't know, because I think that tips is designing such a way that the control needs to know possible there categories, which is why they kept asking where's when we never ask?

43:30

Yeah, it could well be, but one of the kind of posts accident sort of review points, was that there should be some sort of warning rather than just a visual flashing light on their screen because to require 100% monitoring of an aircraft to see the visual flashing that it was, you know, exceeding, one of the parameters.

43:47

Whereas, if you had an oral sort of attention getter, that might have been something that could have saved them, potentially if the controllers had picked up on it sooner. But, you know, they weren't ready to blame. They they couldn't monitor the whole flight path. Interestedly. There were some survivors.

44:02

So yeah, I know I can't believe it including including the captain, I didn't know that Captain survived. Yeah. And those about 40 survivors. I think about quarter of the people on board to survived one of which was was the captain. I think they all had serious injuries. Yeah. And the captain was able to relay some of what happened to sort of layer on top of the flight recorders and cockpit voice recorder.

44:29

So it's all. So there's nothing wrong with the aircraft. The weather was within limits so it's a non-technical, it's a CRM. Yeah issue. Yeah, because of crash. Yeah, in terms of red flags again that they did say the I think the air first officer suggested going around at some point.

44:46

Yeah, he did. Yeah, I mean on any approach or any flight way or close to the ground, but especially a second bridge, somebody starts talking, like that, that should be a signal. Okay, we'll go around. We'll clear this up after. Yeah, totally, yeah. The other pilot might be wrong.

45:00

But let's go around and not waste time if this course. Yeah. So that could have saved them. Yeah, interesting and there's a really good picture that shows the crash site with the runway in the background. Yeah. So it shows because it was on the central line the centre line.

45:16

Yeah I think in two halves now we've just highlighted you know firstly from our own experience and secondly with evidence from the accident of the traps and pitfalls of of circling approaches, I think you put it. Well, it's a way to get into an airport possibly as a kind of last resort.

45:33

But it is an option. But there are some big inherent risks with doing it. Yeah. So I think now, people might never have to fly a certainly approach ever again. Yeah. Because these are RNAV visual approaches are cropping up. Yeah. But it seems to be led by the airlines because the airlines like I was kind of saying earlier don't really want you to be doing a certain approach.

45:55

But I mean, the airline I used to fly for most of

46:23

Most of our destinations in Greece. Yeah. Then the Greek islands they're all some kind of visual to them. So yeah, you know this wasn't an option to not do a certain approach. Anyway. The airlines are putting these visual on ever approaches into our databases in the FMS and into the charts.

46:44

Yeah. What's the differences? What's the reality of that? What's the reality is that rather than doing it on timings and tracks and distances, it's just a set of waypoints in the FMC that the aircraft will overfly with a vertical profile built into it as well. Yeah. It's got vertical and lateral guidance, and it throws you out on the centerline of the runway, that sort of 500 feet.

47:11

So, that one thing that I said earlier, which is this anxiety that, again, we're gonna do everything right. We're gonna brief it, but still want to turn final. It might be wrong. Yeah, that's taken away from. Yeah. Because as far as the aircraft and the GPS are reliable, it will put you in this exact space.

47:30

So I guess the workload element is much lower because you so you can dedicate much more of your attention to outside the flight deck, Although you're almost don't need to. Yeah, you're more confident in the system. So you could maybe accept. But just to be clear this is a visual manoeuvre.

47:51

Yes, nothing has changed there. You're just using the FMS to help you basically. Yes, when it's certainly approached, you're still responsible for making sure that you stay within the design criteria, Right And on a visual approach, you're still and on the second approach making sure that you're clear of weather.

48:07

Yeah, and terrain the whole time but the aircraft will fly, whatever the airline it would seem has programmed in for you, which means that your regardless of the wind, you're always going to be and the exact right point. I wonder that 25 times more. Controlled flight into terrain than a non position approach statistic.

48:26

I wonder how that varies with on RNAV visual approaches. Yeah, I guess time will tell because they're a fairly new. Yeah concept. They are relatively new but they're welcome. There is a not to people you know, here like like to fly visual. Yeah. Yeah. I like to do a certain approach.

48:43

There is the arguement that we're being de-skilled. Yeah. In the automation and on average GPS is just taking over and our actual raw, flying skills have been able to do a certain approach of being worn away. Yeah and that's one for a whole another the podcast. Yeah. That airline I used to fly for these to people used to say it's great.

49:02

Isn't she do visual approaches everywhere and it's not great, to be honest? Yeah, it's kind of fun for when it's going well. But every flight crews got a different idea as well about how to do it. Perhaps not circling approach but a visual approach. Yeah, cool. Well good. Let's, anybody finds himself on a circular approach.

49:21

Hopefully you won't have to do it sort of tracks And says, but if you do be aware of all the little traps that we've talked about and hopefully it will work out for you. Yeah good bye cheers bye.

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